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Abstract
We exploit historical and contemporaneous variation in local credit markets across
Russia to identify the impact of credit constraints on firm-level innovation. We find
that access to bank credit helps firms to adopt existing products and production pro-
cesses that are new to them. They introduce these technologies either with the help
of suppliers and clients or by acquiring external know-how. We find no evidence that
bank credit also stimulates firm innovation through in-house R&D. This suggests that
banks can facilitate the diffusion of technologies within developing countries but that
their role in pushing the technological frontier is limited.
Keywords: Credit constraints; firm innovation; technological change
JEL Codes: D22, F63, G21, O12, O31
∗Muzaffar Ahunov and Carly Petracco provided excellent research assistance. The authors thank Ran-
dolph Bruno and Koen Schoors for sharing their data and Hans Degryse, Pauline Grosjean, Sergei Guriev,
Michael Koetter, Mrdjan Mladjan, Pierre Mohnen, Steven Ongena, Andrea Presbitero, Maŕıa Sebastiá-
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1 Introduction
Firm innovation is an important driver of factor productivity and long-term economic
growth (Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992). In countries close to the technological
frontier, innovation typically entails research and development (R&D) and the invention
of new products and technologies. In less advanced economies, innovation mostly in-
volves imitation as firms adopt existing products and processes and adapt them to local
circumstances (Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti, 2006).
Such innovation helps countries to catch up to the technological frontier but does not
push that frontier itself.
As firms adopt products and processes that were developed elsewhere, technologies
spread across and within countries. The speed with which technologies spread varies
greatly from country to country and can explain up to a quarter of total variation in na-
tional income levels (Comin and Hobijn, 2010). Despite this central role of technological
diffusion in determining wealth outcomes, the mechanisms that underpin the spread of
products and production processes remain poorly understood. This paper focuses on
one such mechanism: the impact of credit constraints on technological adoption.
Funding constraints may limit the adoption of technology because external inven-
tions, which are typically context-specific and involve tacit know-how, are costly to
integrate into a firm’s production structure. Estimates for the manufacturing sector
suggest that imitation can even cost up to two-thirds of the costs of the original in-
vention (Mansfield, Schwartz and Wagner, 1981). Firms may therefore need external
resources to adapt technologies to local circumstances. If external financing is unavail-
able, firms may not be able to adopt and adapt state-of-the-art production technologies,
thus limiting the diffusion of these technologies from rich to poor countries.
Exactly how and how much external finance helps firms to innovate, be it through
in-house R&D or through the adoption of existing products and processes, remains a
matter of debate. A key empirical problem hampering this discussion is the dearth of
firm-level information on these two forms of innovation. This problem is compounded
by the absence of convincing identification strategies to mitigate endogeneity concerns.
To shed more light on this issue, we bring new firm-level evidence to bear and
analyze for a large sample of Russian firms to what extent credit constraints inhibit
innovation. Russia is an interesting setting to explore this question, given that as
in other large emerging markets like India and China firms continue to be plagued
by credit constraints. At the same time, many firms perform poorly when it comes to
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adopting technology.1 We investigate whether this second observation can be explained
by the first.
We employ a rich dataset with information on the demand for and supply of bank
credit in a regionally representative sample of 4,220 Russian firms. We know the ge-
ographical location of these firms and have detailed information on their innovation
activities, including R&D and the adoption of new products, processes, and organiza-
tional structures. Another unique data feature is that we know how firms innovate,
for instance whether they cooperate with suppliers or acquire existing technologies or
patents. We also know whether the products and processes they introduce are only
new to the firm itself or also to the local market or Russia as a whole. This allows us
to demarcate the margins along which access to credit allows firms to innovate and to
facilitate technological diffusion.
Our identification rests on merging these firm-level data with two detailed datasets
on geographical variation in Russian credit markets. First, we use newly collected infor-
mation on the location of over 45,000 bank branches across Russia. Second, we employ
data on historical variation in the local presence of so-called spetsbanks. This variation
reflects bureaucratic power struggles just before the collapse of the Soviet Union and
is unrelated to economic conditions, past or present. We exploit this historical and
contemporaneous variation in the spatial distribution of banks to explain differences
in firms’ ability to access credit and, in a second step, their innovation activity at the
extensive and intensive margins. We also know the lender identity in case a firm bor-
rows. Such matched bank-firm data have not yet been used in the innovation literature
(Herrera and Minetti, 2007) and allow us to assess whether the type of lender impacts
firm innovation over and above the effect of relaxed credit constraints.
To preview our results, we find that especially small and opaque firms are less credit
constrained in local markets where for historical (and exogenous) reasons the number
of bank branches per capita is higher, where branch ownership is more concentrated,
and where foreign banks have a higher market share. We then show that less stringent
credit constraints translate into more technology adoption at both the extensive and
intensive margins but not into more R&D. This suggests that while bank credit does
not allow firms to push the technological frontier itself, banks can play a crucial role
in stimulating factor productivity in developing countries by enabling firms to upgrade
their products and processes. Additional results indicate that foreign-owned banks
1 According to the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report (2013-2014) Russia ranks
126th out of 148 countries in terms of firm-level technology absorption.
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play a special role in this upgrading process. Not only is innovation activity higher in
localities with more foreign banks, we also find that conditional on borrowing receiving
credit from a foreign as opposed to a domestic bank further boosts firm innovation.
We subject these results to a battery of tests and conclude that our inferences are
robust. We also provide three pieces of evidence in support of our identification strategy.
First, we estimate locality-level regressions to analyze to what extent local business-
sector characteristics explain local banking structures. We find that the composition of
local credit markets is orthogonal to a large set of observable business characteristics.
Second, unobservables could explain part of the correlation between local banking and
firm innovation. We therefore quantify the relative importance of omitted variable
bias by assessing the stability of our estimated parameters when adding covariates.
This shows that unobserved heterogeneity is unlikely to explain much of the impact we
document and that, if anything, we may somewhat underestimate the true causal effect.
Third, an important assumption underlying our analysis is that local banking structures
only affect firm innovation through the probability that firms are credit constrained. We
analyze the sensitivity of our results to a relaxation of this strict exogeneity assumption
and continue to find a strong impact of credit constraints on technological innovation.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature after which Section
3 provides a primer on banking in Russia. Section 4 explains our data while Section 5
introduces the identification strategy and empirical methodology. Section 6 describes
our main results after which Section 7 provides two extensions. Section 8 concludes.
2 Related literature
This paper builds on a well-established literature on the role of banks in economic devel-
opment. This literature dates back to Adam Smith’s assertion that the establishment
of the first Scottish banks increased local trade and economic activity.2 Recent empir-
ical research has provided more rigorous evidence on the positive impact of financial
intermediation on economic growth3 while advances in endogenous growth theory have
strengthened the theoretical underpinning of this relationship.4 Especially relevant to
this paper is the Schumpeterian model that Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005)
2 “That banks have contributed a good deal to this increase, cannot be doubted” (1776, p. 394). Subse-
quent contributions include Schumpeter (1934), Gerschenkron (1962) and McKinnon (1973).
3 See for instance La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Beck, Levine and Loayza
(2000), and Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2001).
4 See Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) and King and Levine (1993).
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use to show how financial constraints can prevent developing countries from exploiting
R&D that was carried out in countries closer to the technological frontier.
More recently, economists have started to use microeconomic data to investigate the
relationship between local banking markets and firm innovation an important open
research question (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 2014). Nanda and Nicholas (2014) show
that the severity of local banking distress during the Great Depression was negatively
associated with the quantity and quality of firm patenting. Amore, Schneider and
Žaldokas (2013) and Chava, Oettl, Subramanian and Subramanian (2013) find that
inter-state banking deregulation in the U.S. during the 1970s and 1980s boosted firm
innovation, as proxied by the number of patents. Two related papers use Italian data.
Benfratello, Schiantarelli and Sembenelli (2008) show that a higher local branch density
is associated with more firm innovation. Alessandrini, Presbitero and Zazzaro (2010)
find that local lender concentration has a positive effect on innovation by small firms.
A related literature investigates the role of bank debt as a funding source for firm
innovation. A first set of papers take a rather pessimistic view and stress the uncertain
nature of innovation particularly R&D. This may make banks less suitable financiers
for at least four reasons. First, the assets associated with innovation are often intangible,
firm-specific and linked to human capital (Hall and Lerner, 2010). They are therefore
difficult to redeploy elsewhere and thus difficult for banks to collateralize (Carpenter
and Petersen, 2002). Second, innovative firms typically generate volatile cash flows, at
least initially (Brown, Martinsson and Petersen, 2012). Third, banks may simply lack
the skills needed to assess technologies at the early stages of adoption (Ueda, 2004).
Lastly, ‘technologically conservative’ banks may fear that funding new technologies will
erode the value of collateral underlying existing loans which will mostly represent old
technologies (Minetti, 2011). For all of these reasons, banks may be either unwilling
or unable to fund innovative firms. Hsu, Tian and Xu (2014) provide cross-country
evidence that industries that depend on external finance and are high-tech intensive
are less likely to file patents in countries with better developed credit markets.
Other contributions are more optimistic and stress banks’ ability to overcome agency
problems by building relationships with borrowers (Rajan and Zingales, 2001). Banking,
and in particular relationship lending, may overcome information asymmetries related
to innovative firms that cannot be overcome in public debt markets. De la Fuente and
Marin (1996) show in an endogenous growth model how bank monitoring reduces moral
hazard among entrepreneurs, thus stimulating the development of new product types.
Empirically, Herrera and Minetti (2007) show that longer bank-firm relationships
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are associated with more firm innovation in Italy. Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt and Mak-
simovic (2011) investigate the correlation between the use of bank credit and innovation
in a firm-level dataset across 47 developing countries. They find that the use of exter-
nal finance is related to more firm innovation.5 Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer (2013)
use survey data to show that self-reported credit constraints partly explain cross-firm
variation in innovation activity.
Our contribution is twofold. First, we trace the chain from local banking structures
to firms’ access to credit and their subsequent propensity to innovate. Whereas previ-
ous papers provided evidence on parts of this chain, we combine these elements in an
integrated empirical framework. We also exploit information on the type of lender.
Second, our newly collected data allow us to exploit firm-level information on a
large number of innovation outcomes not just R&D and patenting. This allows for a
rich analysis of the margins along which access to credit can (and cannot) impact firm
innovation. Measures of technological change are typically unavailable at the micro
level and it is the use of such detailed innovation measures that allows us to provide
firm-level evidence in support of one of the main predictions of Aghion, Howitt and
Mayer-Foulkes (2005), namely that financial constraints can impede the absorption of
foreign technologies in developing countries.
3 A short history of Russian banking
The Soviet Union ceased to exist on Christmas Day, 1991 and the Russian Federation
was established the next day. During much of the preceding 70 years, Soviet banking had
been organized in the form of a single monobank, Gosbank, that provided state-owned
firms with loans so they could meet centrally-planned production targets. Perhaps
somewhat surprisingly, socialist leaders attached great importance to the presence of
bank branches across the vast Russian territory. Lenin wrote in the lead up to the
October Revolution that:
“Without big banks socialism would be impossible. The big banks are the
‘state apparatus’ which we need to bring about socialism. A single State
Bank, the biggest of the big, with branches in every rural district [...] will
5 The authors do not address endogeneity concerns and take the actual use of external funding as a
proxy for (the absence of) credit constraints. This is an imperfect measure as firms without a bank
loan may either not need one or need one but be credit constrained.
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constitute as much as nine-tenths of the socialist apparatus [Italics in the
original, Lenin (1917)].”
Just before the Soviet Union collapsed, Soviet bureaucrats decided to reorganize the
vast banking network that spans Russia’s territory.6 As part of Mikhail Gorbachev’s
perestroika program, the Gosbank was split into a central bank and five ‘spetsbanks’:
specialized banks to serve specific segments of the economy. Two of these, the savings
bank (Sberbank) and the foreign-trade bank (Vneshtorgbank) remained under Gos-
bank control. Three others became separate entities to lend to agricultural enterprises
(Agromprombank), projects in housing and social development (Zhilsotsbank), and the
general industry and construction sectors (Promstroibank).
Starting in September 1990, many branches of these spetsbanks were ‘spontaneously
privatized’ as branch managers were offered the opportunity to turn their branch into
an independent joint-stock bank. The sudden and erratic privatization of spetsbanks
only took a few months and was completed by the end of 1990. For our purposes, two
features of this sudden decentralization process are particularly important. First, the
process was not part of any planned economic transition program. Central authorities
exercised little control over the rapid and unexpected decentralization and there was no
market-oriented legal framework to guide it. Berkowitz, Hoekstra and Schoors (2014,
p.6) describe how the process was conducted by “Soviet administrators on the basis
of their own preferences” which were “divorced from forces shaping organizations in
market economies.” The resulting geographical distribution of bank branches across
Russia’s territory therefore reflected idiosyncratic and bureaucratic forces rather than
economic fundamentals.
Second, the sudden privatization of spetsbanks before the collapse of the Soviet
Union also shaped the entry and location of new commercial banks soon after the
Union ceased to exist. Johnson (2000) describes how spetsbank managers benefited from
transferring resources that they received through the state system into newly established
commercial banks. It was attractive for managers to set up new banks near existing
spetsbanks to facilitate the move of state resources into private hands. As a result,
the initial geographical branching structure from before the Soviet breakdown became
even more cemented into Russia’s new commercial banking system. The historical
persistence in exogenous variation in local branch density, which resulted from arbitrary
bureaucratic decisions just before the Soviet Union collapsed, is a crucial feature of the
6 This section draws on Johnson (2000), Schoors (2003), and Schoors and Yudaeva (2013).
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Russian banking landscape and one that we exploit in our empirical analysis.
Once a new banking landscape was established in the early 1990s, years of high
inflation meant that Russian banks both (former) spetsbanks and new commercial
banks mainly invested in short-term government bonds rather than lend to firms.
This phase came to a halt in 1998 when the Russian government defaulted, the ruble
devalued, and many banks went bankrupt. Banks increasingly started to operate as
financial intermediaries after the 1998 financial crisis, when the state reduced its fund-
ing needs. Households and corporations rapidly expanded their borrowing against the
background of an improving macroeconomic environment, higher income levels, and in-
stitutional reforms. In December 2003 a comprehensive deposit insurance scheme was
introduced, which not only led to a rapid increase in household deposits but also to the
revocation of numerous banking licenses.
Today, the Russian financial system remains bank dominated as is the case in many
other emerging markets. The supply of alternative funding sources for firm innovation,
such as venture capital and private equity, is very limited. For instance, in 2013 the
stock of private equity investments stood at just 0.01 percent of GDP, compared to
slightly over 1 percent in the U.S. and 0.45 percent in Western Europe.7
4 Data
Our identification strategy outlined in Section 5 requires a detailed picture of the
banking landscape around individual firms, the credit constraints these firms experience,
and their innovation activities. To this end we merge two new micro datasets.
4.1 Firm-level data
Our firm-level data come from the 5th round of the Business Environment and Enterprise
Performance Survey (BEEPS V) conducted by the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank between August 2011 and October
2012. Face-to-face interviews were held with the owner or main manager of 4,220 firms
across Russia with the objective to understand how particular aspects of the business
environment hold back firm performance.8 An important improvement over earlier
7 Source: Emerging Markets Private Equity Association.
8 Our sample size is 3,849 as we exclude 38 firms with unknown loan status, 37 firms with a loan from
an unknown source, and 296 firms that had applied for a loan but whose application was yet to be
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rounds is the comprehensive coverage of BEEPS V, with at least one region covered in
each of Russia’s federal districts.9
4.1.1 Firm innovation
The BEEPS V survey for the first time included an Innovation Module to elicit de-
tailed information about firms’ innovation activities. This new module covers both the
adoption of existing technologies and in-house R&D. We use these data to construct a
number of firm-level innovation measures which are summarized in Online Appendix
Table A2 (see Table A1 for definitions). The average Russian firm introduced 0.77 inno-
vations in the last three years (Aggregate innovation) with 42 (27) percent of the firms
implementing at least one (two) innovation(s). The existing literature has often used a
definition of Technological innovation that only takes product and process innovations
into account. We follow this literature as technological innovation may arguably be
most affected by credit constraints. About 13 (14) percent of all firms report a Product
(Process) innovation.
Organization innovation and Marketing innovation were more prevalent, with on
average 24 and 27 percent of firms engaged in these forms of innovation, respectively.
We aggregate these two innovation types into one Soft innovation measure. Just over
half of all firms had implemented at least one soft innovation over the past three years.
Finally, 11 percent of all sampled Russian firms undertook some form of R&D. Our
data show that there is substantial variation across as well as within Russian regions in
the incidence of these innovation activities. The Online Appendix contains more details
about our innovation data.
4.1.2 Firms’ access to credit
To assess the impact of bank credit on firm innovation we need an indicator of whether
firms are credit constrained or not. To create this measure, we use the BEEPS V
data to first distinguish between firms with and without a demand for credit. We then
split the former group into those that applied for a loan and those that did not apply
finalized or had been withdrawn. All our findings are robust to the inclusion of these firms.
9 Russia can be divided into nine federal districts or alternatively into twelve economic zones. The
next level of disaggregation consists of regions (so-called federal subjects). The BEEPS V sample
framework encompasses non-agricultural firms with at least five employees (fully state-owned firms
are excluded). Random sampling with three levels of stratification ensures representativeness across
industry, firm size and region. Stratification allows us to use industry fixed effects in all estimations.
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because they thought they would be turned down. Finally, among those that applied,
we observe which firms were granted credit and which ones were refused a loan. Using
this categorization, we follow Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004) and define credit-
constrained firms as those that were either discouraged from applying or were rejected
when they applied. Discouraged firms are an important category to capture as they
may differ systematically from non-applying firms that do not need a loan. Table A2
indicates that 55 percent of all sample firms needed a loan. Between 52 percent (narrow
definition) and 68 percent (broad definition) of these were credit constrained.10 Just
over a quarter of all firms had a loan at the time of the survey.
The BEEPS V survey asks borrowing firms to disclose the name of their lender as
well as other loan terms (less than five percent of the firms did not know the name of
their lender or did not want to share this information). For each lender we establish
whether it is state owned (at least 30 percent of its shares held by municipalities or
the central government), foreign owned (at least 50 percent of share capital held by
foreigners) or in private domestic hands. For each foreign bank, we also identify the
parent bank and its country and city of incorporation. Finally, we link each bank to
Bankscope, Bureau van Dijk’s database of banks’ financial statements. Table A2 shows
that 46 percent of all borrowers had a loan from a state bank, 42 percent from a private
domestic bank, and 12 percent from a foreign bank.
We also distinguish private banks according to the main lending technique they
apply when dealing with SMEs. This distinction is based on information collected
through face-to-face interviews with CEOs of private Russian banks as part of the EBRD
Banking Environment and Performance Survey (BEPS). CEOs were asked to rate on
a five-point scale the importance (frequency of use) of the following techniques when
lending to SMEs: relationship lending; fundamental and cash-flow analysis; business
collateral; and personal collateral. Although, as expected, almost all private banks find
building a relationship (knowledge of the client) of some importance, 42 percent of the
interviewed banks find building a relationship“very important”, while the rest considers
it only “important” or “neither important nor unimportant.” We categorize the former
group of banks as relationship banks.11 For 758 out of 1,010 borrowing firms we know
whether their lender is a relationship bank, a transaction bank, or a state bank.
10The broad definition also includes firms that were discouraged because of complex application pro-
cedures or because informal payments were necessary. Throughout our analysis we use this broad
definition of credit constraints but our results are robust to using the narrow one (cf. column 1 of
Table 5). The Online Appendix contains more details about our firm-level credit variables.
11See Beck, Degryse, De Haas and Van Horen (2014) for details about the BEPS survey.
9
Table 1 provides a first, univariate look at the link between credit constraints and
innovation. We divide firms into three categories: those with a loan (1,010 firms), those
without a loan and without a need for one (1,555), and those without a loan but with an
unfulfilled demand for credit (1,284). The latter group contains all credit-constrained
(rejected or discouraged) firms. Among firms that needed credit, there is a striking
difference in the likelihood of innovation activity between those that received credit (54.7
percent implemented at least one innovation) and those that did not (40.7 percent). A
formal two-sample t-test confirms that this difference in means is statistically significant
at the 1 percent level. The lowest incidence of innovation (35.8 percent) occurs among
firms that did not demand a loan.
Credit status also correlates with the extent of innovation. Table 1 shows that 38.3
percent (21.0 percent) of borrowing firms introduce at least two (three) different types
of innovations, compared with only 24.8 percent (13.1 percent) of the credit-constrained
firms. Similarly, firms that have access to credit carry out more innovation as measured
by our technological and aggregate indices. All of these differences are highly significant.
A clear picture emerges with regard to access to credit and innovative activity: it is
mostly those firms that apply for a loan and get one that innovate.
We next examine whether, conditional on borrowing, bank ownership is linked to
firm innovation. This does not appear to be the case: innovation at the extensive margin
is very similar among borrowers from private domestic banks (52.9 percent), state banks
(55.9 percent), and foreign banks (55.9 percent). There is some indication that foreign
bank loans are associated with more innovation at the intensive margin, with 43.2
percent of firms borrowing from a foreign bank carrying out at least two innovations
compared to 35.3 (39.8) percent of firms that borrow from a private domestic (state)
bank. However, formal comparisons fail to reject the null hypothesis of no difference in
means across bank types, at least in this univariate setup.
4.2 Geographical data on bank branches
Small business banking remains a local affair despite rapid technological progress and
financial innovation.12 Banks continue to lend mainly to nearby firms to keep trans-
portation and agency costs within check and local variation in the number and type of
12 See Petersen and Rajan (2002); Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004); Degryse and Ongena (2005)
and Butler and Cornaggia (2011).
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bank branches may therefore explain why small firms in certain areas are more credit-
constrained than similar firms elsewhere. The local nature of small-business lending
plays a central role in our identification.
To assess the impact of local banking markets on firms’ credit constraints and inno-
vation behavior, we employ new data from the 2nd Banking Environment and Perfor-
mance Survey (BEPS), conducted by the EBRD in 2012. As part of this survey a team
of Russian-speaking consultants collected the geo-coordinates of 45,728 branches of 853
Russian banks. Figure A1 in the Online Appendix shows the distribution of banking
and general economic activity across Russia. Panel (a) indicates that economic pro-
duction is concentrated in the south-west. Panel (b) depicts the location of the 45,728
bank branches in our dataset. A comparison shows that economic and banking activity
are spread similarly over the country.
Using this detailed picture of the local banking landscape we can now link each
BEEPS firm to the various bank branches that are located in its city or town (locality).
This allows us to construct three locality-level banking variables. First, we calculate
a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to measure bank concentration in each locality
where at least one BEEPS firm is located. There are 159 such localities in our dataset.
Following Degryse and Ongena (2005, 2007) we define a bank’s local market share as
the percentage of branches that it owns in the locality. Let Nb denote the total number








The average value of the HHI, which ranges between 0.04 and 1, is 0.29 (Table A2 and
Figure A2).
Second, we measure the local market share of foreign banks. Let Fb denote the total
number of foreign banks in locality k. We construct:







The market share of foreign banks ranges between zero and 26 percent and averages 10
percent (Table A2 and Figure A2).
Lastly, we create a third locality-level banking variable. We use regional data from
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Berkowitz, Hoekstra and Schoors (2014) to measure historical variation in the num-
ber of spetsbanks per million inhabitants in each locality for which we have firm-level
data. Since the number of localities is greater than the number of regions, we use an
interpolation procedure with weights equal to the inverse of the firm’s distance to the
capital city in its own region as well as the capital cities of its neighbouring regions.
The average locality has 1.89 spetsbanks per million inhabitants and the measure varies
between 0.16 and 7.45 (Table A2 and Figure A2).13
Similar to the historical branching variation exploited by Guiso, Sapienza and Zin-
gales (2004) for the case of Italy, Berkowitz et al. (2014) provide evidence that the
geographical concentration of spetsbanks in 1995 was unrelated to drivers of contem-
poraneous or future economic growth, but instead reflected historical idiosyncrasies
that subsequently persisted. We investigate this claim by systematically correlating
the number of spetsbanks per million population with a large number of regional firm
characteristics (Appendix Figure A3), political and economic indicators (Figure A4
and A5), and proxies for regional democratization (Figure A6). In all cases, we find
no strong correlation between these measures and the presence of spetsbanks in 1995.
We provide more statistical evidence on the exogeneity of the variation in spetsbank
presence in Section 6.5.
5 Methodology
5.1 Empirical model
Our empirical strategy comprises two main steps. First, we assess how local variation
in bank ownership, bank concentration, and the historical presence of spetsbanks affect
firm-level credit constraints. Second, we analyze how access to credit, or the lack
thereof, impacts the probability that a firm innovates. Consider the empirical model:
Firm Innovijk = α1CredConstrijk + z1,ijkδ1 + ηj + uijk (1)
CredConstrijk = β1Local Bankingk + z2,ijkδ2 + ηj + vijk (2)
13We also create an alternative spetsbank measure that excludes branches that were originally owned
by the bank for housing and social development (Zhilsotsbank). One may worry that these branches
lend less to firms and may therefore lead us to underestimate the impact of access to credit on firm
innovation. Excluding Zhilsotsbank branches does not materially alter any of our results in terms of
economic or statistical significance.
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for firm i operating in industry j in locality k. Firm Innovijk is either an innovation
index (Technological, Soft or Aggregate innovation), an innovation intensity variable (At
least 2 innovation types or At least 3 innovation types) or one of the underlying, detailed
indicators of firm innovation. Cred Constrijk is a firm-specific indicator for access to
credit as defined in Section 4.1.2, while LocalBankingk comprises the three geographical
banking variables (these variables are not highly correlated with all absolute pairwise
correlation coefficients below 0.40).
In the first equation, z1,ijk is a vector of observable firm covariates that co-determine
the probability that a firm innovates (see Section 5.2), while in the second equation
z2,ijk is a vector of observable firm covariates that influence whether a firm is credit
constrained. In both equations, ηj is a vector of industry fixed effects that are defined
at the ISIC Rev 3.1 2-digit level. These control for unobserved industry variation and
ensure that our estimates are not confounded by attributes common to firms in the
same industry. They also control for sector-specific innovation opportunities via intra-
industry knowledge and technology spill-overs. We are interested in β1, which can be
interpreted as the impact of local credit market conditions on credit constraints in a
locality, and α1, the effect of not having access to credit on innovation.
The model in (1)-(2) is characterized by two complications. First, Cred Constrijk
may correlate with the error term in (1), uijk, if innovating firms are more likely to
run into credit constraints. Even if firms do not rely on bank loans for innovation,
they may become credit constrained if innovation reduces the internal funds available
for subsequent production. This increases the probability that the firm hits a financial
constraint and the incidence of innovation can become positively correlated with the
reported severity of such constraints. Second, we only observe whether a firm is credit
constrained for the sub-sample of firms that indicate they need a loan. Hence, even in
the absence of the first complication, Cred Constrijk is potentially correlated with uijk
if the demand for credit is systematically related to uijk. Either of these complications
is enough to render Cred Constrijk endogenous.
Since we do not always observe whether a firm is credit constrained, we can neither
estimate β1 in (2) with an ordinary least squares (OLS) procedure nor get a reliable
estimate of α1 in (1) with two-stage least-squares (2SLS) estimation. However, we
do know the conditions under which the Cred Constrijk variable is missing: when a
firm does not demand a bank loan. So we complement our empirical model with the
following selection equation (Heckman, 1979):
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DemandLoanijk = 1(z3,ijkδ3 + ηj + wijk > 0) (3)
where z3,ijk is a vector of covariates that determine the probability that a firm needs
bank credit. We observe the loan demand status for all firms in the sample.
This setup allows us to follow the two-step procedure outlined in Wooldridge (2002,
p. 568) to derive consistent parameter estimates for both α1 and β1. We first obtain the
inverse Mills’ ratio, λijk, from a probit estimation of equation (3) using all observations.
Second, we use the sub-sample for which we observe both Firm Innovijk and Cred
Constrijk and estimate by 2SLS:
Firm Innovijk = α1CredConstrijk + z1,ijkδ1 + γ1λijk + ηj + uijk (4)
CredConstrijk = β1Local Bankingk + z2,ijkδ2 + γ2λijk + ηj + vijk (5)
where LocalBankingk are the instruments in (5) and the second stage is (4). This
procedure suits our purposes as it accommodates binary endogenous variables without
additional assumptions since equation (5) is a linear projection for Cred Constrijk.
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We test the hypothesis that there is no selection by the t-statistic on γ̂1.
5.2 Identification
To identify the selection parameters, we include two variables in (3) to determine
whether a firm demands credit or not (both variables are subsequently excluded from
(4) and (5)). These indicate whether the firm leases fixed assets and whether it receives
any subsidies. A firm that leases typically aims to conserve scarce working capital (the
capital-preservation motive). Leasing activity may therefore signal that a firm’s capital
position is tight and that its demand for bank credit is high. As for subsidy use, Popov
and Udell (2012) argue that firms that apply for a subsidy reveal a need for external
funding.
14All results go through when using a bivariate probit estimator, the alternative for a model with
both a binary regressor and a binary outcome variable. This robustness reflects that our treatment
probability (being credit constrained) is over 50 percent. Chiburis, Das and Lokshin (2012) show that
coefficients estimated with linear IV and binary probit models differ less when treatment probabilities
are high. Since the authors also show that below 10,000 observations IV confidence intervals tend to
be more conservative, we opt for this approach.
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In equation (5) we use our three geographical banking variables Bank concentra-
tion, Share foreign banks, and Spetsbanks as instruments. There exists an extensive
literature on the impact of bank competition on firms’ access to credit and this lit-
erature has long been characterized by two opposing views. On the one hand, there
is theory (Pagano, 1993) and evidence (Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996) to suggest that
bank competition alleviates credit constraints as more loans become available at better
terms. However, other contributions suggest that less bank competition may benefit
firms, especially more opaque ones, as market power allows banks to forge long-term
lending relationships (Ongena and Smith, 2001; Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 1995). A
number of papers attempt to reconcile both views. Bonaccorsi di Patti and Dell’Ariccia
(2004) show that while banks’ market power boosts firm creation in Italy, in particular
in opaque industries, additional market power has a negative effect above a certain
level. Likewise, Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) use a cross-country dataset to show that
bank concentration promotes the growth of sectors that depend on external finance but
lowers overall economic growth.
The sign for Share foreign banks is a priori undetermined too. A higher local foreign
bank presence may limit access to credit if domestic banks have a comparative advan-
tage in reducing information asymmetries vis-à-vis local firms (Mian, 2006). They may
then make better lending decisions based on ‘soft’ information extracted during lend-
ing relationships (Berger and Udell, 2002; Petersen and Rajan, 2002). On the other
hand, however, foreign banks may apply transaction technologies, such as credit scoring,
that effectively use ‘hard’ information (Berger and Udell, 2006; Beck, Ioannidou and
Schäfer, 2012). Finally, we expect a negative effect of Spetsbanks on credit constraints
as Berkowitz, Hoekstra and Schoors (2014) document a lasting positive impact of the
presence of spetsbanks on regional lending.
For all three instruments, the identifying assumption is that the structure of local
and regional banking markets is orthogonal to the error term in (4). That is, the local
banking structure only affects firm innovation through its impact on the probability
that firms are credit constrained. While plausible, this exclusion restriction could be
violated if the location of bank branches is not exogenous but related to local factors that
also correlate with firm innovation. While we cannot test the validity of the exclusion
restrictions directly, we report tests of overidentifying restrictions under the null that
our three instruments are valid. Because our third instrument is constructed on the basis
of a different rationale it exploits persistent historical rather than contemporaneous
banking variation these tests for overidentifying restrictions are quite compelling: if
15
one of the instruments is valid, they serve as a test of the validity of the other ones.
We also note that for the Spetsbanks instrument there is strong prima facie histor-
ical evidence, outlined in Berkowitz, Hoekstra and Schoors (2014), suggesting that the
geographical dispersion of spetsbanks was mainly determined by bureaucratic forces.
The authors also bring a wealth of statistical evidence to bear to support the claim
that local spetsbank presence is unrelated to economic, institutional and demographic
indicators. Our own analysis in Section 4.2 confirms this claim. The historical persis-
tence in this exogenous branch dispersion still matters as spetsbanks account for over
twenty percent of all present-day Russian loans. Moreover, as discussed in Section 3,
the historical spetsbank variation also influenced the subsequent entry and location of
new commercial bank branches. We return to our identifying assumption in Section 6.5
where we present further evidence on the exogenous nature of our instruments.
5.3 Control variables
We include a set of controls that may affect credit constraints and firm innovation
(summary statistics in Table A2). First, we use Firm size as measured by the number
of full-time employees. Larger companies may benefit more from innovative activities
owing to economies of scale. They also tend to be more transparent as their activities are
more easily verifiable to banks (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell, 1998). To
control for informational transparency more directly, we include a dummy for whether
the firm has its financial statements certified by an external auditor (External audit).
We also account for firm Age: young firms tend to be less transparent than older ones
on account of their limited track record (Herrera and Minetti, 2007).
Second, it is important to consider a firm’s intrinsic ability to innovate. We include a
dummy for whether the firm has a training program for its permanent employees (Train-
ing); a dummy for whether the establishment uses technology licensed from a foreign
company (Technology license, this excludes office software); a dummy for whether the
firm has an internationally recognized quality certification such as ISO9000 (Quality
certification); and the number of years that the main manager has worked in the firm’s
industry (Manager’s experience). We also control for State connection, which indicates
whether the firm was previously state owned, is currently partly state-owned, or is a
subsidiary of a previously state-owned enterprise. About 9 percent of all firms in our
dataset have some state connection (fully state-owned firms were excluded from the
BEEPS V sample framework).
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Third, we control for firms’ incentives to innovate. We include a dummy variable
(National sales) for whether the market for the firm’s main product is national (sold
mostly across Russia) or local. Firms often innovate to expand production or increase
efficiency in response to investment opportunities. Although industry fixed effects partly
capture this, we also control more directly for such opportunities. First, we use a dummy
that is one if the firm expects sales to increase over the next year (Expect higher sales).
Second, we include a dummy that is one if the firm purchased fixed assets over the past
year (Purchased fixed assets). Investments in equipment or buildings may reflect growth
opportunities that make it more likely that a firm introduces one or more innovations.15
6 Results
6.1 Credit demand
We first report the results of our Heckman selection equation in Table 2. The depen-
dent variable is a dummy that is one if the firm has a demand for bank credit and
zero otherwise. The probit specification includes the variables Leasing fixed assets and
Received subsidies along our standard set of firm covariates. We also include Bank con-
centration, Share foreign banks, and Spetsbanks, the locality-level instruments that we
use as credit-supply shifters in the next stage of our analysis. We saturate the model
with fixed effects for industries and for Russia’s nine federal districts.
As expected, both Leasing fixed assets and Received subsidies are positively and
significantly correlated with a firm’s demand for credit. Importantly, we find no strong
relationship between our local banking structure variables and the demand for credit.
This gives us additional confidence that these variables are good candidates to identify
shifts in the supply of credit in the next stage.
6.2 Local banking markets and firms’ credit constraints
In Table 3 we present the first-stage of our 2SLS procedure to estimate the impact of
the local banking market on firms’ credit constraints. The dependent variable in the
15 Guadalupe, Kuzmina and Thomas (2012) show how Spanish firms acquired by multinationals tend
to simultaneously purchase new machinery and adopt new innovative production methods.
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first stage is Credit constrained, a dummy that is one if the firm needed credit but was
either rejected or discouraged from applying for a loan. Our three main independent
variables are the credit-supply shifters Bank concentration, Share foreign banks, and
Spetsbanks. We include these alongside our battery of standard covariates as well as
district and industry fixed effects.
We note that throughout the table the first stage F-statistic is close to or above
ten, indicating that our instruments are sufficiently strong. The soundness of our iden-
tification strategy is also grounded in the validity of the instrument set. Hansen over-
identification tests show that the null hypothesis that our three instruments are jointly
valid cannot be rejected.
Column 1 indicates that a more concentrated local banking market is associated
with a lower probability that a firm is credit constrained. A one standard deviation
increase in local lender concentration reduces the probability that a firm is constrained
by 9.3 percentage points. This suggests that competitive credit markets may pre-
vent banks from establishing long-term lending relationships that benefit small busi-
nesses. Indeed, if we would move a firm from a locality characterized by high lender
competition such as central Moscow, where the HHI is 0.04 to a locality with
less banking competition such as Saransk in the Volga region, where the HHI is
0.15 then this firm would have a 3.4 percentage points lower probability of being
credit constrained, all else equal.
A higher proportion of foreign-owned bank branches in a locality is also associated
with less binding credit constraints. Compared to state banks and private domestic
banks, foreign banks appear to be better placed to overcome agency problems in Rus-
sia.16 This effect is quite substantial. The coefficient for Share foreign banks implies
that a one standard deviation increase in this share reduces the probability of a firm
being credit constrained by 10 percentage points. If we would move a firm from Moscow
to Rostov, with a share of foreign bank branches of 0.12 and 0.09, respectively, then
this would increase the probability of being credit constrained by 4.3 percentage points,
all else equal. Lastly, as expected, a higher local presence of spetsbanks is associated
with less credit constraints. A one standard deviation increase in the number of spets-
banks per million inhabitants reduces the probability of being credit constrained by 2.7
percentage points.
If we take the results on the positive impact of local bank concentration on credit
16Giannetti and Ongena (2009) find for a set of transition countries that foreign bank lending stimulates
growth in firm sales and assets although this effect is dampened for small firms.
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constraints at face value, then this impact should be stronger for opaque firms, for
whom lending relationships are most important. Columns 2-5 in Table 3 provide evi-
dence based on interaction terms between the HHI and a number of firm characteristics
that supports this assertion. Local bank concentration reduces credit constraints in par-
ticular for smaller firms (column 2), younger firms (column 3), firms without a quality
certification (column 4), and unaudited firms (column 5, this coefficient is imprecisely
estimated).
We push this idea further in columns 6-8 of Table 3. We now split our firm sample
into two industry groups and estimate the impact of bank concentration on credit
constraints for each group separately. In column 6 we distinguish between firms in
high-tech versus low-tech industries (see Table A1 for the industry classification). In
our sample around 20 (80) percent of all firms is part of a high-tech (low-tech) industry.
In line with findings by Benfratello et al. (2008) for Italy, who use a similar industry
classification, the impact of local lender concentration on credit constraints is almost
twice as high in high-tech than in low-tech industries.17 It is easier for firms in low-
tech industries to obtain financing via arm’s length lending techniques, and this type
of lending tends to perform better in less concentrated lending markets.
In column 7 we distinguish between firms with a high (above median) versus low
dependence on external finance. We define external finance dependence by averaging for
each industry the proportion of working capital that firms finance through sources other
than internal funds or retained earnings (as reported by these firms in the BEEPS V
Russia survey). As expected, we find that the impact of lender concentration on credit
constraints is more pronounced in industries that rely heavily on external funding.
This finding concurs with Nanda and Nicholas (2014) who show that during the Great
Depression the negative impact of bank distress on innovation was stronger for U.S.
firms that depended heavily on external finance.
Likewise, in column 8 we distinguish between firms in industries characterized by rel-
atively high (above median) levels of tangible assets (properties, plants and equipment)
versus firms in industries with below median levels of asset tangibility. This industry
classification is only available for manufacturing firms and thus reduces our sample (cf.
Aghion and Kharroubi, 2013). The results show that local bank concentration mainly
17 High-tech industries are characterized by larger information asymmetries and more severe agency
problems between borrowers and lenders (Holmstrom, 1989).
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alleviates credit constraints among firms without access to easily collateralizable assets.
These are exactly the type of firms that one expects to benefit from longer-term lend-
ing relationships that tend to flourish in concentrated credit markets. Note that these
consistent interaction effects also assuage worries about possible omitted variables bias
at the local level (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2004).
Jointly these findings provide consistent evidence that local credit-market concen-
tration alleviate credit constraints for small and opaque businesses in particular. For
instance, column 2 shows that a one standard deviation increase in lender concentra-
tion reduces the probability of being credit constrained by 27.6 percentage points for
the smallest firms in our sample. This impact gets progressively smaller for larger and
older firms. When a firm reaches 232 employees or 22 years of age, lender concentration
starts to have a negative impact on access to credit, indicating that larger and older
firms benefit from bank competition. A robustness test in Table 5 provides evidence for
a more general non-linearity in the impact of banking concentration on access to credit.
In the most concentrated credit markets, further concentration hurts access to credit
for all types of firms, in line with the results by Bonaccorsi di Patti and Dell’Ariccia
(2004) for Italy.18
6.3 Credit constraints and firm innovation
Table 4 presents our baseline estimates of the impact of credit constraints on firm
innovation as taken from the second stage of our 2SLS approach. Credit constrained is
the endogenous variable that we instrument as per column 1 of Table 3. We control for
various standard innovation determinants as well as industry and district fixed effects.
Column 1 indicates that credit-constrained firms are less likely to innovate at the
extensive margin. The impact of credit constraints is large. The estimates in columns 2
and 3 imply that a constrained firm has a 22 (32) percentage points smaller probability
of carrying out a product (process) innovation compared with a firm that is not con-
strained, all else equal. The coefficient is somewhat less precisely estimated for product
innovation. Column 4 shows that reduced credit constraints also translate into more
organizational and marketing innovation, as aggregated in our Soft innovation measure.
18We ran similar regressions where we interact Share foreign banks with the same set of firm charac-
teristics. These unreported results (available upon request) show that the local presence of foreign
banks mainly reduces credit constraints for larger firms and for firms in industries with above median
levels of asset tangibility. This indicates that bank concentration and foreign-bank presence tend to
benefit different parts of the firm population.
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The economically and statistically stronger effect for process innovation is interesting
as process innovation may be more difficult to fund with bank loans than product
innovation. Firms may worry that banks either disclose proprietary information about
new production processes to competitor firms as in Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995)
and Yosha (1995) or use such information to hold up the firm (Rajan, 1992). Such
issues apply less to product innovation, the results of which are easily observable to
buyers and other outsiders. Our findings suggest, however, that access to bank credit
facilitates both types of technological innovation. One reason may be that process
innovation is often closely linked to investments in new machinery that may be used
as collateral (Hall, Lotti and Mairesse, 2009). Yet the positive impact on process
(and product) innovation holds even when we control for whether the firm invested in
fixed assets over the past three years. It also holds when we exclude firms that both
introduced a new process and invested in fixed assets (results available upon request).
The results in the last four columns of Table 4 indicate that less-constrained firms
are also more likely to innovate more at the intensive margin. Columns 6 and 7 show
that access to credit is associated with a higher likelihood of firms undertaking at least
two or three different types of innovative activity (for instance, combining a product
with a process innovation). Columns 8 and 9 indicate that there is also a positive effect
on the number of new products and processes introduced in each of these innovation
categories. The point estimate in column 8 suggests that unconstrained firms introduce
on average three new products more than credit-constrained firms do, all else equal.
Improvements in production technologies often depend on concurrent investments in
auxiliary systems. Our results suggest that access to bank credit allows firms to invest
in such related support systems and hence to exploit the benefits of process innovation
more fully. Appendix Table A3 shows that firms that are less credit constrained are not
only more likely to improve their core production methods but also to upgrade support
services such as purchasing, accounting, and maintenance systems. Moreover, column
4 indicates that access to credit and the resulting changes in production structures
mean that firms manage their production more tightly. Firms are less likely to work
without any production targets that is, goals with regard to the quantity, quality,
and on-time delivery of output.19 They also achieve these production targets with less
effort (column 6). Taken together, our results suggest that borrowing firms upgrade
and better manage their production processes. Such improvements can have significant
19These results are based on a smaller sample as the BEEPS V survey only asked manufacturing firms
with at least 50 employees about their management practices.
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productivity impacts as good management practices including lean manufacturing
processes and performance tracking are important drivers of firm-level productivity
(Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007).
The estimated coefficients for our covariates are in line with the existing literature.
The statistically strongest results indicate that innovative activity is higher among
dynamic firms that expect higher sales, offer formal labour training, and have recently
invested in fixed assets. Large firms those that operate at the national level are
more likely to innovate too, which is in line with cross-country evidence by Ayyagari
et al. (2011). Finally, firms that have a quality certification, license technology from a
foreign company, or provide employee training are also more likely to innovate.
6.4 Robustness
In Table 5 we subject our baseline second-stage results to a battery of robustness checks.
In each regression the dependent variable is Technological innovation as in column 1 of
Table 4.20 First, in column 1 we replace our broad measure of credit constraints with a
more narrowly defined variable. This narrow measure does not regard firms that were
discouraged from applying for a loan because they thought that banks’ procedures were
too complex or because they expected to have to pay a bribe as credit constrained. Our
results hold and even increase slightly in economic magnitude.
In column 2, we add six firm covariates to further reduce the risk of omitted variables
bias. These are dummy variables that indicate whether the establishment is part of a
larger firm; is Foreign-owned ; is an Exporter ; or is located in the Main business city of
a region or in another Large city (>1 million inhabitants). We also include the Share of
temporary workers. Only the first of these is precisely estimated, indicating that firms
that belong to a larger organization are less likely to innovate, presumably because such
larger firms typically innovate at a more centralized level. Importantly, compared to
Table 4, we find that the coefficient for Credit constrained hardly changes.
Next, in columns 3-7, we use alternative banking indicators instead of the simple HHI
index in the first stage of our analysis. In column 3, we use an HHI index where banks’
local market share is weighted by the bank’s total assets across Russia. In this way we
take into account that large banks may have more local market power. In column 4, we
use the aggregate market share (in terms of number of branches) of the three largest
20We apply all tests to all specifications in Table 4 and find the same level of robustness. For brevity
Table 5 only presents the results for Technological innovation.
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banks in the locality. In column 5, we measure the average profits-to-operating revenue
ratio of local banks (weighted by their number of local branches). Higher relative
profits, as measured at the national level, may indicate more market power at the local
level. Similarly, in column 6 we calculate the branch-weighted average Lerner index for
all banks in a locality. In all cases, the negative impact of credit constraints on firm
innovation continues to hold. Lastly, in column 7 we add an additional dummy to the
first stage to single out localities with an HHI of 0.2 or larger.21 The first stage, with a
higher F-statistic of 12.75, shows that the negative impact of lender concentration on
credit constraints turns positive in very concentrated markets.
In columns 8 and 9, we experiment with different fixed effects. Instead of fixed ef-
fects at the federal district level, column 8 includes fixed effects for Russia’s twelve main
economic zones. In column 9, we go a step further and now replace our locality-level
instruments in the first stage with locality fixed effects. In both cases, the negative re-
lationship between credit constraints and innovation holds up. The coefficient estimate
in column 9 provides a lower bound for the impact of credit constraints on innovation.
In columns 10 to 14, we rerun our baseline regressions on various sub-samples. In
column 10, we exclude all firms that are five years or younger. In this way we reduce
the probability that recently established firms have sorted endogenously into localities
with banking structures that are more conducive to firm innovation. In column 11,
we exclude the twenty most innovative localities to make sure that our results are not
driven by a few high-innovation clusters. For similar reasons we exclude the three most
innovative regions (Samara, Moscow and Voronezh) in column 12. In column 13, we
exclude firms in Russia’s two main urban agglomerations, Moscow and St. Petersburg,
which are also the country’s financial centres. Lastly, in column 14, we exclude localities
without at least one foreign bank branch. There are only forty of such localities in
our dataset (containing 71 surveyed firms), reflecting the extensive branch footprint
of foreign banks across Russia. On the basis of all of these alternative sub-samples,
our first stage remains strong and we continue to find an economically and statistically
significant negative impact of credit constraints on firm innovation.
In columns 15 to 17 we structure our standard errors differently. While in the
baseline regressions we present robust standard errors clustered at the industry level,
we now cluster at the district level (column 15), regional level (column 16), or as
recommended by Chiburis et al. (2011) bootstrap the errors (column 17). While this
21We choose this cut-off because U.S. anti-trust laws stipulate that a merger can be approved without
further investigation if concentration in the post-merger market remains below this level.
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somewhat increases the standard errors, in all three cases we continue to find an effect
of credit constraints on innovation that is statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Lastly, in column 18 we re-estimate our baseline model using a limited information
maximum likelihood (LIML) estimator, which is less likely to generate bias if the first
stage of the IV procedure is relatively weak. Although the F-statistic points to minimal
bias from our instruments in the first stage, we want to guard against any possible
distortion due to the combination of a relatively small sample size and multiple instru-
ments. Both the LIML estimate and the associated standard errors are only marginally
larger than the baseline estimate. Given this similarity, we are comfortable that our first
stage does not introduce any distortion to the actual causal effect we aim to identify.
6.5 The exogeneity of local banking markets
An important assumption underlying our analysis is that the structure of local banking
markets only affects firm innovation through the probability that firms are credit con-
strained. While plausible, this restriction may not hold if the location of bank branches
is related to unobserved local factors that correlate with firm innovation. While we
cannot test the validity of the exclusion restriction directly, our analysis so far has
produced some reassuring evidence. Tests of overidentifying restrictions consistently
cannot reject the null that our three instruments are valid. These instruments which
we effectively use as local credit supply shifters also appear to be unrelated to credit
demand. For the Spetsbanks instrument there is strong historical evidence to suggest
that the geographical dispersion of these banks was determined by bureaucratic rather
than economic considerations. This section provides four additional pieces of evidence
to mitigate endogeneity concerns.
First, one may worry that banks opened (more) branches in regions that at present
tend to be more conducive to innovation. We therefore collect time-series data from
the Russian central bank on regional banking and correlate the regional change in the
number of credit institutions between 2002 and 2011 with innovation activity in 2012.
We measure regional innovation as the percentage of firms that were involved in product
or process innovation. For both innovation types there is a positive but statistically
insignificant correlation with the establishment of new banks in the preceding decade
(p-values of 0.24 and 0.60, respectively).
Second, we run locality-level regressions where the dependent variable is either Bank
concentration, Share foreign banks, or Spetsbanks. We then assess to what extent a
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battery of locality-level firm characteristics can explain local banking structures. If the
banking structure is driven by the composition of the local business sector, then we
should find significant relationships between our firm characteristics, averaged at the
locality level, and our banking instruments. However, Appendix Table A4 indicates that
there is no significant correlation between, on the one hand, the share of large firms,
share of audited firms, average firm age, share of exporters, share of firms with access to
high speed internet, share of firms that experienced a power cut during the last year, and
the average firm’s perception of various aspects of the local business environment (local
security, political instability, and skills level of the local workforce) and, on the other
hand, banking concentration, the presence of foreign banks, or historical variation in the
presence of spetsbanks. When we conduct an F-test for the joint significance of these
locality-level firm characteristics, we cannot reject the null of no systematic relationship
with the local banking structure. Credit-market characteristics thus appear unrelated
to a large set of observable characteristics of the local business sector.
In Appendix Table A5 we perform a similar exercise to analyze the correlation
between regional spetsbank density and a battery of regional political and economic
variables (taken from Bruno, Bytchkova and Estrin, 2013). We do this separately for
measurements of these variables over 1996-2000, 2001-2004 and 2005-2008. We do
not find any evidence of a systematic relationship between local institutions and the
presence of spetsbanks. This supports the assertion by Berkowitz, Hoekstra and Schoors
(2014) that the historical variation in spetsbank density is orthogonal to economic
fundamentals that could have impacted regional economic growth.
Third, while we control for a large number of firm-level, locality-level, and regional-
level observable characteristics throughout our analysis, remaining unobservables may
linger to generate a direct effect of local banking on firms’ propensity to innovate. In
Appendix Table A6 we therefore use the methodology developed by Altonji, Elder and
Taber (2005) and Bellows and Miguel (2009) to quantify the importance of omitted
variable bias. Intuitively, what we do is to analyze how the coefficient for Credit con-
strained changes when we include a rich set of firm-level and locality-level covariates.
If this change is substantial then it is more likely that adding more (currently unob-
servable) covariates would further reduce the estimated impact. In contrast, if the
coefficient turns out to be stable when adding controls, then we can be more confident
when interpreting our results in a causal sense. We measure coefficient stability as the
ratio between the value of the coefficient in the regression including controls (numera-
tor) and the difference between this coefficient and the one derived from a regression
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without covariates (denominator). This shows how strong the covariance between the
unobserved factors explaining firm innovation on the one hand and firms’ credit con-
straints on the other hand needs to be, relative to the covariance between observable
factors and firms’ credit constraints, to explain away the entire effect we find.
The odd columns in Table A6 replicate our baseline regressions of Table 4 while the
even columns also include the following locality-level controls: average distance of bank
branches to their national HQs; average equity-to-assets ratio of banks (weighted by
the number of branches of each bank); bank branch density; share of firms with high-
speed internet; share of firms that experienced a power cut in the past year; and five
variables that measure the locality-level average of firms’ perceptions of the following
business constraints: security, business licensing, political instability, courts and edu-
cation (Appendix Table A1 contains exact definitions). The ratios in the odd columns
then compare our baseline specification (as shown in these columns) to an (unreported)
specification without any firm controls. The ratios in the even columns compare a
specification with firm and localityy-level controls (as shown in the even columns) to
an (unreported) specification with neither firm nor locality controls.
The Altonji ratios suggest that to explain away the full impact of credit constraints
on firm innovation, the covariance between unobserved factors and firms’ access to credit
needs to be at least 2.9 times as high as the covariance of the included controls (column
4). For Technological innovation the ratio lies even around 15. By way of comparison,
Altonji et al. (2005) estimate a ratio of 3.55 which they interpret as evidence that
unobservables are unlikely to explain the entire effect they document. The negative
ratios in columns 2, 5 and 6 reflect that here the coefficient for Credit constrained
actually slightly increases when we add firm or locality covariates, suggesting that our
estimates somewhat underestimate the true causal effect. We conclude that it is unlikely
that unobserved heterogeneity explains away the impacts we document.
Fourth, we analyze the sensitivity of our core results to a gradual relaxation of the
strict exogeneity assumption that we imposed so far.22 In particular, we follow the local-
to-zero approximation method of Conley, Hansen and Rossi (2012) and allow for a small
positive and direct effect of local banking on firm innovation. We view this direct effect
22There are two reasons why this relaxation may have a limited impact. First, the fact that local
unobservable variation appears to play a minor role mitigates concerns about our instruments be-
ing correlated with such unobservables. Second, first-stage F-statistics point to strong instruments
throughout our analysis. With strong instruments some violation of the exclusion restriction has less
of an effect on the precision of our estimates. See Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995) on the trade off
between instrument strength and the degree to which the exclusion restriction is violated.
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as a random parameter that can be described by a prior distribution. We then obtain
frequentist confidence regions that have the correct ex ante coverage under this assumed
distribution. We assume that the direct effect of banking concentration and the share of
foreign banks on firm innovation is weakly positive. More specifically, we use a uniform
prior distribution of γ ∈ [0,+δ]2 where γ would be the vector of coefficients on the
two banking variables in a regression of innovation on credit constraints, the banking
variables, and our usual set of controls.
Figure A7 in the Online Appendix plots the 90 percent confidence interval derived
from this local-to-zero approximation method for various values of δ. δ = 0 corresponds
to the strict exogeneity case, with our point estimate reflecting the value in column 1
of Table 4. As we relax the exclusion restriction with higher values of δ, our point
estimate continues to be statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Only at very
high values (δ > 0.6) is the coefficient less precisely estimated. However, the impact of
being credit constrained on innovation remains around the 0.50 mark, which points to
an economically significant effect even under the least stringent assumptions.
7 Extensions
7.1 Credit constraints and the nature of firm innovation
Table 6 exploits the detailed nature of the BEEPS Innovation Module by analyzing the
impact of credit constraints on various other innovation outcomes. Since we consider
a large number of outcomes, unadjusted p-values may overstate the confidence we can
have in any individual estimate. We therefore correct for multiple-hypothesis testing by
applying a Bonferroni correction where we consider the outcomes in each of the three
panels of Table 6 as a family of related hypotheses. The family-wise error rate is then
the probability of at least one Type I error in the family. We limit this error rate to
0.10 by adjusting the p-values that we use to test each individual null hypothesis. We
take into account that the outcomes within a family are correlated (see Aker et al.,
2012). The inter-variable correlation ranges between 0.2 and 0.4 across the panels. We
separately indicate the estimates that are significant at conventional levels and those
that also remain significant based on adjusted p-values.
Panels A and B focus on product and process innovation. Columns 1-2 show that the
impact of credit constraints on innovation is not driven by the adoption of technologies
that are also new to the firm’s local or national market. While access to credit allows
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firms to introduce new products and processes, these were typically already available in
the market that the firm operates in. This suggests that access to credit helps technolo-
gies to diffuse further within but not so much across regional and national borders. This
is in line with an earlier literature documenting how technological diffusion depends on
the spread of information (Jaffe et al., 2002), which may decline with distance (Maha-
jan and Peterson, 1985). Firms therefore learn from (and imitate) spatial neighbors in
particular (Mansfield, 1961). Our results show how access to credit can facilitate this
process of local technological diffusion.
Columns 3 to 5 provide additional insights into how firms innovate when they can
access bank credit. We find no impact on the development of new products or processes
based on the firm’s own ideas. Instead, firms tend to make technological advances by
actively co-operating with others (column 4). An important strategy is to make signif-
icant improvements in production processes with the help of suppliers (this coefficient
remains statistically significant at the 1 percent level even after the Bonferroni correc-
tion). This tallies with the idea that imports are an important channel of technology
diffusion (Keller, 2004).
Column 1 in Panel C shows that with easier access to credit, firms are also more likely
to spend funds on the acquisition of external knowledge. This includes the purchasing
or licensing of inventions, patents or know-how to start producing a new product or
process. Here too, bank credit facilitates the diffusion of technologies across firms.
There is also some evidence that access to credit allows firms to attract consultancy
know-how, in particular to improve general business skills. However, this estimate is
not robust to the Bonferroni correction (Panel C, columns 4 and 5).
In contrast, there is no evidence that bank credit allows firms to undertake more
R&D (column 2) or to apply for a patent or trademark (column 3). The absence of an
impact of local credit availability on R&D is in line with evidence from Italy (Herrera
and Minetti, 2007) and cross-country data (Hsu, Tian and Xu, 2014) but contrasts with
the recent literature that links U.S. bank deregulation to increased patenting activity.
Our results suggest that bank credit is not well-suited to finance R&D, at least not
in an emerging market context where other constraints to R&D may be prevalent too.
Note that the absence of an effect of credit on R&D does not simply reflect that Russian
firms do not undertake R&D. Both in terms of patents granted and in terms of R&D
expenses Russia lags the developed world but leads many other emerging markets.23
23In 2012, Russia registered 1.4 patents per 1,000 workers, compared with 2.9 in the USA, 4.6 in
Germany, and 1.0 in Brazil, China and India. R&D expenses as a percentage of GDP stood at 3.0%
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7.2 Bank type and firm innovation
In Appendix Table A7, we limit our sample to firms with a bank loan and investigate
whether the type of lender impacts innovation over and above the liquidity effect of the
loan. We distinguish between private and state banks and then split the private banks
in either foreign versus domestic banks (Foreign bank, Panel A) or relationship versus
transaction banks (Relationship bank, Panel B). We expect a positive coefficient for
the Foreign bank dummy if foreign banks help borrowers more to adopt products and
processes from elsewhere. They may be particularly well-suited to facilitate innovations
that are based on imported technologies or that depend on cooperation with foreign
suppliers, strategies that the previous sub-section indicated to be important.
We expect relationship lenders to have a competitive advantage in overcoming the
information asymmetries associated with firm innovation. However, to the extent that
firms fear that relationship lenders may exploit their inside knowledge of the firm’s
innovative projects, they may be less willing to invest in such innovation in the first
place. Hence we only expect a positive coefficient for Relationship bank if the superior
ability of these banks to overcome information asymmetries is not fully offset by firms’
fear of being held up.
The OLS results in Table A7 provide little evidence to suggest that bank ownership
or lending techniques play a major role in stimulating firm innovation and technology
adoption (beyond the main effect of access to credit). There is nevertheless some statis-
tically weak evidence that borrowers from foreign banks innovate more at the intensive
margin (panel A, columns 5 and 6).
A weakness of the OLS results in Table A7 is that they do not account for the
endogenous matching between banks and firms. This may obfuscate any underlying
impact of bank type on innovation activity. In Table 7, we therefore follow an IV
procedure where in the first stage we instrument the foreign-bank dummy with the
variable Closure of banks with regional HQs. This region-level instrument captures
the number of branches of banks headquartered in a region that were closed between
January 2004 and January 2006 (per million population). After the December 2003
introduction of the Russian deposit insurance scheme, a large number of bank licenses
were unexpectedly revoked by the Russian financial regulator. There was considerable
regional variation in the number of branches that were suddenly closed as a result, in
compared with 14.6% in the US, 12.4% in Germany, 2.8% in Brazil, 3.2% in China, and 2.2% in India
(sources: PATSTAT and Unesco).
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effect leading to regionally varying negative shocks to lending relationships between
firms and domestic banks. We exploit this variation to determine the probability that
a firm ended up borrowing from a foreign bank. We expect a positive coefficient in this
first stage as more domestic bank closures strengthened the local market position of
foreign banks.
Column 1 of Table 7 shows that a one standard deviation increase in sudden branch
closures is associated with a 4.1 percent higher probability that a firm borrowed from a
foreign bank, all else equal. Columns 2 to 8 show the second-stage results. Borrowing
from a foreign bank helps firms to introduce new products as well as new marketing
and organizational systems (the former result is only significant at the 10 percent level).
Borrowers from foreign banks are also more likely to innovate more on the intensive mar-
gin (columns 7 and 8). That is, once we account for the endogenous matching between
firms and banks, we find that foreign banks display a superior ability to help firms adopt
and implement new products and technologies.24 They may help borrowers access for-
eign technologies, already used by their foreign clients, and facilitate the subsequent
adaptation by granting a loan. Moreover, firms may trust foreign banks more than
domestic banks not to disclose proprietary information about new production processes
to local competitor firms.
Finally, in Table 8 we analyze whether lender type determines the interest rates
that borrowers pay. The results show clearly that state banks charge significantly lower
interest rates across the board. This holds when controlling for firm covariates, loan
characteristics (maturity, size, presence of collateral), industry and locality fixed effects,
and fixed effects for the year in which the loan was issued. The annual interest rate
discount provided by state banks amounts to between 0.6 and 1.2 percentage points.
This is fairly limited as the average nominal interest rate charged by banks was 14.5
percentage points.
We find no differences in the rates charged by foreign banks versus the benchmark
group of private domestic banks (column 1) or in the rates charged by relationship
versus transaction banks (column 2). Columns 3 to 8 also reveal no difference between
innovating and non-innovating firms in the rates they pay and this again holds across
lender types. Interestingly, columns 4, 6, and 8 indicate that innovating firms do pay
a mark-up when borrowing from relationship banks. While we caution against over-
24In unreported regressions we also test whether state banks perform differently compared to private
domestic banks in facilitating firm innovation (again conditional on a loan being in place). We find
no such difference.
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interpreting this result, it does suggest that banks that are well-suited to extract soft
information from innovating firms may exploit this information by charging higher in-
terest rates, as in Rajan (1992). This effect is also quite substantive in economic terms:
innovative firms are typically charged over two percentage points more when borrowing
from a relationship instead of a transaction lender.
8 Conclusions
We have exploited historical and contemporaneous variation in local credit markets
to identify the impact of credit constraints on firm innovation in a large emerging
market. Our motivation is the stylized fact that many emerging markets continue to
display low levels of technological adoption and hence fail to realize their “advantage
of backwardness” (Gerschenkron, 1952). Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) put
forward the idea that credit constraints can prevent these countries from exploiting the
global pool of available technologies. We use firm-level data to put this idea to the test.
Our results show that where banks ease local credit constraints, firms innovate more
at the extensive and intensive margin. This finding turns out to be robust to various
tests, appears not to be driven by omitted variables bias, and withstands less stringent
exogeneity assumptions in our instrumental variables procedure.
Compared with the existing literature, our data allow us to paint a more compre-
hensive picture of how access to bank credit affects firm innovation. We find no direct
impact of bank credit on in-house R&D: the role of banks in pushing the technological
frontier appears limited. We do find, however, that banks help firms to adopt products
and processes that were new to them but that were already available elsewhere in their
local market. Firms introduce these new technologies either with the help of suppliers
or by simply acquiring external know-how. Better access to bank loans helps firms
to manage their production processes more tightly as well. We also present evidence
that foreign-owned banks may be particularly well-suited to facilitate such technology
adoption. Taken together, these findings indicate that better access to bank credit
can facilitate the diffusion of new products and production methods across emerging
markets. Without access to sufficient credit, firms can remain stuck in a pattern of
low productivity and weak growth, even after other businesses in their country have
managed to upgrade their operations.
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Amore, M.D., C. Schneider and A. Žaldokas (2013), “Credit Supply and Corporate
Innovation”, Journal of Financial Economics, forthcoming.
Ayyagari, M., A. Demirguc-Kunt and V. Maksimovic (2011), “Firm Innovation in
Emerging Markets: The Role of Finance, Governance, and Competition”, Journal of
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 46(6), 1545-80.
Beck, T.H.L., H. Degryse, R. De Haas, and N. Van Horen (2014), “When Arms’ Length
is Too Far. Relationship Banking over the Business Cycle”, EBRD Working Paper No.
169, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, London.
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The BEEPS V Innovation Module
All questions on innovation in the BEEPS V Innovation Module comply with the OECD
guidelines for collecting technological innovation data as laid down in the 3rd edition of
the so-called Oslo Manual. The survey also incorporates suggestions by Mairesse and
Mohnen (2010) with regard to best practices in innovation survey design.
Firm managers were asked whether during the past three years they introduced new
products or services (product innovation); production methods (process innovation);
organizational practices or structures (organization innovation); marketing methods
(marketing innovation); or conducted R&D. The Oslo Manual defines these types of
innovation, a classification that dates back to Schumpeter (1934), in more detail. A
product innovation involves the introduction of a good or service that is new or sig-
nificantly improved with respect to its characteristics or intended uses. This includes
significant improvements in technical specifications, components and materials, incor-
porated software, or other functional characteristics. A process innovation is the im-
plementation of a new or significantly improved production or delivery method. Here
one can think of significant changes in production techniques, equipment, software, or
logistical methods. Organizational innovation includes significantly improved or new
knowledge management, supply-chain management or quality control systems. Market-
ing innovation relates to new methods of advertising, product promotion and pricing
strategies. Lastly, R&D comprises creative work undertaken on a systematic basis to
increase the stock of knowledge and to use this stock to devise new applications.
Interviewees were presented with show cards that contained examples of innovations
in each of these categories. It was made clear that “new” meant new to the firm but
not necessarily new to the local, national or international market. Firms that had
undertaken at least one form of innovation were asked detailed questions on the nature
of this innovation. A verbatim description of the main innovative product or process
(if any) was noted down by the interviewer. All verbatim innovation descriptions were
carefully checked by a team of independent evaluators to ensure that we only consider
innovations in line with the OECD guidelines. For instance, product customization is
not innovation unless characteristics are introduced that differ significantly from existing
products. The reader is referred to Schweiger and Zacchia (2014) for more details on
data cleaning.
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Constructing firm-level indicators of credit constraints
We follow Popov and Udell (2012) to construct our firm-level credit variables and we
consider BEEPS question K16: “Did the establishment apply for any loans or lines
of credit in the last fiscal year?”. For firms that answered “No”, we go to question
K17, which asks: “What was the main reason the establishment did not apply for any
line of credit or loan in the last fiscal year?” For firms that answered “Yes”, question
K18a subsequently asks: “In the last fiscal year, did this establishment apply for any
new loans or new credit lines that were rejected?” We classify firms that answered “No
need for a loan” to K17 as unconstrained, while we classify firms as constrained if they
either answered“Yes”to K18a or answered“Interest rates are not favorable”; “Collateral
requirements are too high”; “Size of loan and maturity are insufficient”; or“Did not think
it would be approved” to K17.
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Table 1
Access to bank credit and firm innovation: Univariate results
Any innovation At least 2 
innovation types







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm has a loan 54.65%*** 38.32%*** 20.99%*** 0.38*** 1.09*** 1,010
Private domestic bank 52.94% 35.29% 20.00% 0.38 1.03 425
State bank 55.89% 39.83% 21.63% 0.37 1.11 467
Foreign bank 55.92% 43.22% 22.03% 0.39 1.19 118
No loan 37.97% 23.04% 11.38% 0.23 0.66 2,839
No demand 35.76% 21.61% 9.97% 0.21 0.63 1,555
Credit constrained 40.65% 24.77% 13.08% 0.25 0.70 1,284
Total 42.35% 27.05% 13.90% 0.27 0.77 3,849
Share of firms with: Average no. of innovations:
This table reports univariate results on the relationship between access to bank credit and firm innovation in Russia. *, **, *** indicate significance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively, for a two-sample t-test of a difference in means with unequal variances. For the t-tests we compare innovation
activity among all firms with a loan (top row) to all credit-constrained firms (penultimate row). Table A1 in the Appendix provides variable definitions.
Table 2
Determinants of firms' credit demand
Dependent variable: Loan demand (1)
Leasing fixed assets (0/1) 0.3119***
(0.0444)








Industry fixed effects Yes




This table reports a first-stage probit Heckman selection
regression where Leasing fixed assets and Received 
subsidies are demand shifters that are excluded in the
subsequent analysis. The dependent variable is a dummy
equal to '1' if the firm needed bank credit; '0' otherwise. The
regression includes industry and district fixed effects, a
constant, and the same firm controls as in Table 4. Robust
standard errors are clustered by industry and shown in
parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% level, respectively. Appendix Table A1 contains all
variable definitions.
Table 3
Local credit markets and firms' credit constraints across Russia
Dependent variable: Credit constrained (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Bank concentration -0.3137** -0.9546*** -1.1051*** -0.3682** -0.3955**
(0.1456) (0.2311) (0.2893) (0.1555) (0.1570)
Share foreign banks -1.4237*** -1.4047*** -1.4020*** -1.4042*** -1.4037*** -1.4406*** -1.4287*** -1.2802**
(0.3166) (0.3151) (0.3217) (0.3246) (0.3113) (0.3112) (0.3149) (0.5291)
Spetsbanks -0.0205*** -0.0199*** -0.0205*** -0.0205*** -0.0200*** -0.0206*** -0.0207*** -0.0161
(0.0066) (0.0068) (0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0067) (0.0066) (0.0065) (0.0126)
Bank concentration * (log) Firm size 0.1752***
(0.0548)
Bank concentration * (log) Firm age 0.3544***
(0.1160)
Bank concentration * Quality certification (0/1) 0.4136**
(0.1804)
Bank concentration * External audit (0/1) 0.2651
(0.1651)
Bank concentration * Low-tech industry (0/1) -0.2937*
(0.1520)
Bank concentration * High-tech industry (0/1) -0.5636*
(0.2827)
Bank concentration * Low external finance dependence (0/1) -0.2090
(0.1834)
Bank concentration * High external finance dependence (0/1) -0.4334***
(0.1200)
Bank concentration * Low-tangibility industry (0/1) -0.7711***
(0.2621)
Bank concentration * High-tangibility industry (0/1) -0.1427
(0.2422)
Inverse Mills' ratio 0.3858*** 0.3752*** 0.3820*** 0.3983*** 0.3811*** 0.3838*** 0.3822*** 0.4438**
(0.1250) (0.1239) (0.1236) (0.1219) (0.1236) (0.1253) (0.1276) (0.2120)
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,089 2,089 2,089 2,089 2,089 2,089 2,089 760
F-statistic on IVs 10.51 14.48 17.80 9.60 8.02 8.20 9.73 3.90
Hansen J-statistic (p-value) 0.63 0.68 0.69 0.68 0.71 0.79 0.73 0.61
This table reports results from regressions to estimate the impact of the composition of local banking markets on firms' credit constraints (the first stage of our IV
estimation). The dependent variable is a dummy equal to '1' if the firm is credit constrained (broad definition) and '0' otherwise. The inverse Mills' ratio in column 1
is derived from the probit model in Table 2 and from analogous probit models for the other columns. All regressions include a set of firm-level control variables,
industry and district fixed effects, and a constant. Controls include (log) Firm size , (log) Firm age , External audit , Training , Technology license , Quality 
certification , National sales , Expect higher sales , Purchasing fixed assets , (log) Manager's experience and State connection . Robust standard errors are clustered
at the industry level and shown in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The F-statistic on IVs is for the F-test that
the instruments are jointly insignificant, while the p-value of the Hansen J-statistic is for the overidentification test that the instruments are valid. See Table A1 in
the Appendix for all variable definitions.
Table 4
Credit constraints and firm innovation across Russia










At least 2 
innovation 
types









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Credit constrained (0/1) -0.5470*** -0.2237* -0.3233** -0.7569*** -1.2928*** -0.4953*** -0.4017*** -3.1181* -1.0277***
(0.1720) (0.1190) (0.1400) (0.2862) (0.4001) (0.1902) (0.1353) (1.6827) (0.2914)
(log) Firm size -0.0509** -0.0241 -0.0268 -0.0323 -0.0800 -0.0263 -0.0282 -0.2604 -0.0721*
(0.0244) (0.0156) (0.0171) (0.0417) (0.0551) (0.0278) (0.0176) (0.3062) (0.0377)
(log) Firm age 0.0420** 0.0258* 0.0162 0.0119 0.0574 0.0263* 0.0239 0.3001 -0.0138
(0.0203) (0.0137) (0.0105) (0.0291) (0.0406) (0.0142) (0.0153) (0.4191) (0.0228)
External audit (0/1) 0.0339 0.0290 0.0049 0.0425 0.0752 0.0001 0.0162 0.7176* 0.0246
(0.0432) (0.0269) (0.0242) (0.0544) (0.0817) (0.0288) (0.0276) (0.4044) (0.0500)
Training (0/1) 0.0721*** 0.0278* 0.0443*** 0.1954*** 0.2682*** 0.1081*** 0.0763*** 0.0713 0.1730***
(0.0214) (0.0166) (0.0093) (0.0291) (0.0425) (0.0205) (0.0164) (0.2411) (0.0369)
Technology license (0/1) 0.0360 0.0559*** -0.0199 0.2123** 0.2507** 0.0821** 0.0858*** 0.9960 0.1622**
(0.0349) (0.0181) (0.0291) (0.0849) (0.0999) (0.0395) (0.0232) (0.8658) (0.0677)
Quality certification (0/1) 0.1008 0.0293 0.0716** 0.1129* 0.2073* 0.0651* 0.0915** 0.4500 0.1790*
(0.0643) (0.0372) (0.0349) (0.0654) (0.1136) (0.0393) (0.0437) (0.8834) (0.0979)
National sales (0/1) 0.1018** 0.0457* 0.0561** 0.0603 0.1613** 0.0733*** 0.0595*** 1.1582*** 0.0942*
(0.0408) (0.0272) (0.0226) (0.0402) (0.0646) (0.0273) (0.0198) (0.4427) (0.0535)
Expect higher sales (0/1) 0.0857** 0.0372* 0.0485** 0.1411*** 0.2242*** 0.0983*** 0.0463*** 0.4434 0.1275***
(0.0362) (0.0210) (0.0224) (0.0367) (0.0589) (0.0214) (0.0169) (0.2751) (0.0452)
Purchasing fixed assets (0/1) 0.0875** 0.0268 0.0607*** 0.1021* 0.1891** 0.0793*** 0.0440*** 0.1284 0.1353**
(0.0348) (0.0271) (0.0227) (0.0618) (0.0816) (0.0252) (0.0157) (0.2007) (0.0674)
(log) Manager's experience 0.0401 0.0259* 0.0143 -0.0042 0.0371 0.0005 -0.0020 -0.1337 0.0298
(0.0252) (0.0143) (0.0161) (0.0229) (0.0404) (0.0115) (0.0130) (0.3200) (0.0327)
State connection (0/1) -0.0768 -0.0464 -0.0304 -0.1172 -0.2098 -0.0747 -0.0493 0.7572 -0.0453
(0.0500) (0.0299) (0.0291) (0.0891) (0.1291) (0.0505) (0.0390) (1.1284) (0.0875)
Inverse Mills' ratio 0.4554*** 0.1788 0.2766** 0.3508 0.8269** 0.4121*** 0.2990*** 2.4508 0.3288
(0.1679) (0.1127) (0.1101) (0.2912) (0.3792) (0.1552) (0.1128) (2.7261) (0.2250)
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,089 2,089 2,089 2,070 2,070 2,089 2,089 2,089 2,089
This table reports results of regressions to estimate the impact of credit constraints on firm innovation. This is the second stage of our IV estimation; first
stage results are reported in column 1 of Table 3. Credit constrained (0/1) is the endogenous variable, instrumented as in column (1) of Table 3. The inverse
Mills' ratio is derived from the probit model in column 1 of Table 2 and from analogous probit models for the other columns. All regressions include industry
and district fixed effects and a constant. Robust standard errors are clustered at the industry level and given in parentheses; *, **, *** indicate significance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Table A1 in the Appendix contains all variable definitions.
































































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Credit constrained (0/1) -0.6787** -0.5537*** -0.5610*** -0.3883** -0.6538*** -0.5436*** -0.4020** -1.0723*** -0.3009*** -0.6172*** -0.5608*** -0.3772** -0.6183*** -0.6109*** -0.5470** -0.5470*** -0.5470** -0.5600***
(0.2735) (0.1895) (0.1847) (0.1646) (0.2029) (0.1692) (0.1795) (0.3424) (0.0672) (0.1881) (0.1819) (0.1515) (0.2162) (0.2099) (0.2513) (0.2047) (0.2279) (0.1778)
Part of large firm (0/1) -0.0733*
(0.0414)




Share of temporary workers 0.0131
(0.0239)
Main business city (0/1) 0.0506
(0.0612)
Large city (0/1) 0.0477
(0.0381)
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Inverse Mills' ratio Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,089 2,054 2,089 2,089 2,089 2,089 2,089 2,089 2,011 1,604 2,067 1,867 1,934 2,046 2,089 2,089 2,089 2,089
First-stage statistics:
  F-statistic on IVs 9.54 9.01 9.04 15.01 8.74 8.75 12.75 4.84 473.46 9.64 12.93 16.82 9.07 8.17 13.37 7.73 12.00 10.51
  Hansen J-statistic (p-value) 0.72 0.51 0.56 0.46 0.35 0.54 0.11 0.96 0.005 0.79 0.54 0.21 0.65 0.67 0.63 0.63 - 0.66
This table reports results from alternative specifications of our baseline model (Table 4, column 1). The dependent variable is Technological innovation . The Heckman selection equation and the IV first stage are not reported; key first-stage statistics are presented in the last
two rows. The first stage of our IV estimation is analogous to column 1 of Table 3, except for columns 3-7 and 9. In columns 3-7, we use alternative measures for banking competition and in column 9 we use locality dummies as instruments. The Credit constrained variable is
defined as before, except in column 1 where it is defined according to the narrow definition. All regressions include the following standard firm controls: (log) Firm size , (log) Firm age , External audit , Training , Technology license , Quality certification , National sales , Expect 
higher sales , Purchasing fixed assets , (log) Manager's experience and State connection . Column 2 also controls for being Part of a larger firm , being a Foreign-owned firm , being an Exporter , Share of temporary workers , and whether firm is in the Main business city of the
region or in a Large city, defined as having >1 million people. All regressions include the inverse Mills' ratio, industry fixed effects, firm controls and a constant. District fixed effects are included in all regressions except columns 8-9. The inverse Mills' ratio is derived from a
probit model of credit demand as in Table 2. Robust standard errors are clustered at the industry level and shown in parentheses except in columns 14 and 15 where we cluster at the district and regional level, respectively. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
level, respectively. The F-statistic on IVs is for the F-test that the instruments are jointly insignificant, while the p-value of the Hansen J-statistic is for the overidentification test that the instruments are valid. Table A1 in the Appendix contains all variable definitions.
Technological innovation
Alternative instruments Sub-sample estimation Standard errorsFixed effectsAlternative variables
Table 6
Credit constraints and the nature of firm innovation
Panel A: Product innovation












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Credit constrained (0/1) -0.1287 -0.0260 0.0055 -0.2292** -0.0736
(0.1013) (0.0806) (0.0977) (0.0937)†† (0.0511)
Panel B: Process innovation












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Credit constrained (0/1) -0.1972* -0.0509 0.0270 -0.3503*** -0.1723***
(0.1011) (0.0563) (0.0896) (0.1163)†† (0.0554)†††
Panel C: R&D and acquisition of external knowledge
Dependent variable: Spent on 
external 
knowledge








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Credit constrained (0/1) -0.1797*** 0.0017 0.0033 -0.2703** -0.2723*
(0.0672)†† (0.0726) (0.0753) (0.1274) (0.1508)
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Inverse Mills' ratio Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,089 2,089 2,089 2,082 2,089
This table reports results of regressions to estimate the impact of credit constraints on firm innovation.
This is the second stage of our IV estimation. Credit constrained (0/1) is the endogenous variable,
instrumented as in column 1 of Table 3. The inverse Mills' ratio is derived from the probit model in Table
2, column 1 and from analogous probit models for the other columns. All regressions include industry and
district fixed effects and a constant. Robust standard errors are clustered at the industry level and given in
parentheses; *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. †, ††, and †††
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively, when adjusting for multiple-hypothesis
testing via a Bonferroni correction where the outcomes in each panel are part of one family. Table A1 in the
Appendix contains all variable definitions.
Table 7
Borrowing from a foreign bank and firm innovation
First stage













At least 2 
innovation 
types
At least 3 
innovation 
types
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Loan from foreign bank (0/1) 1.2674* 0.9837* 0.2837 4.2838** 5.5521** 1.8400** 0.7970*
(0.7572) (0.5801) (0.4488) (1.9712) (2.3366) (0.7808) (0.4096)
Closure of banks with regional HQs 0.0160***
(0.0055)
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,026 1,026 1,026 1,026 1,017 1,017 1,026 1,026
F-statistic on IVs 8.48
This table reports IV regression results on the relationship between foreign bank ownership and firm innovation. Closure of banks with regional HQs
measures the number of branches of banks headquartered in a region that were closed between January 2004 and January 2006, per million population. All
regressions include industry and district fixed effects, firm controls and a constant. Firm controls include a dummy for borrowing from a state bank. The F-
statistic on IVs is for the F-test that the instrument is insignificant. Robust standard errors are clustered at the industry level and shown in parentheses. *, **, ***
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Table A1 in the Appendix contains all variable definitions.
Second stage
Table 8
Lender type, innovation and the cost of borrowing
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
State bank -0.6623** -1.0238** -0.6746** -1.0924* -0.5296* -0.9116* -0.8003** -1.1902**
(0.3115) (0.4995) (0.2775) (0.5533) (0.2856) (0.5357) (0.3301) (0.5317)
Foreign bank 0.6873 0.4486 0.5830 0.4728
(0.6278) (0.6140) (0.5745) (0.6397)
Relationship bank -0.1926 -0.7238 -0.5679 -0.5967
(0.7843) (0.6818) (0.6802) (0.7186)
Innovation 0.0964 -0.1311 0.3028 -0.0405 -0.0773 -0.4305
(0.3815) (0.3987) (0.8088) (0.7162) (0.6006) (0.6301)
Innovation * State bank 0.0351 0.2798 -0.7950 -0.4063 0.6957 0.9850
(0.4358) (0.4697) (0.8565) (1.0812) (0.7891) (0.8026)
Innovation * Foreign bank 0.6556 0.7780 0.9734
(0.8485) (1.0590) (1.4503)
Innovation * Relationship bank 1.7580** 2.7577*** 2.4734*
(0.7619) (0.9515) (1.2808)
Loan maturity (log) 0.5330** 0.5647* 0.5451** 0.5508* 0.5276** 0.5461* 0.5464** 0.5649*
(0.2505) (0.3244) (0.2416) (0.3199) (0.2453) (0.3209) (0.2460) (0.3256)
Collateral required (0/1) 0.9237 0.7889* 0.9574 0.8512* 0.9556 0.8008 0.9696 0.8829*
(0.6659) (0.4524) (0.6571) (0.4477) (0.6747) (0.4862) (0.6579) (0.4349)
Loan size (log) -0.3994*** -0.3492** -0.3938*** -0.3543*** -0.3973*** -0.3558*** -0.3907*** -0.3470**
(0.1286) (0.1380) (0.1227) (0.1240) (0.1252) (0.1274) (0.1285) (0.1333)
Locality fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan issue year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 589 436 589 436 589 436 589 436
R-squared 0.4705 0.5281 0.4721 0.5376 0.4726 0.5368 0.4728 0.5355
This table reports regression results on the relationship between lender type, innovation activity and borrowing cost. Innovation stands for Technological 
innovation in columns (1)-(4), for Product innovation in columns (5) and (6), and for Process innovation in columns (7) and (8). Interaction terms with
Innovation are similarly defined. All regressions include industry, locality and year fixed effects, firm controls and a constant. Robust standard errors are
clustered at the industry level and shown in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Table A1 in the
Appendix contains all variable definitions.
Annual interest rate (%)
Product innovation Process innovationTechnological innovation
Table A1
Variable definitions and data sources
Variable Definition Data source
Innovation activity
Product innovation (0/1) Dummy=1 if the firm introduced a new or significantly improved product or service 
in the last three years; 0 otherwise.
BEEPS V
Process innovation (0/1) Dummy=1 if the firm introduced a new or significantly improved method for the 
production or supply of products or services in the last three years; 0 otherwise.
BEEPS V
Organization innovation (0/1) Dummy=1 if the firm introduced a new or significantly improved organizational or 
management practice or structure in the last three years; 0 otherwise.
BEEPS V
Marketing innovation (0/1) Dummy=1 if the firm introduced a new or significantly improved marketing method 
in the last three years; 0 otherwise.
BEEPS V
R&D (0/1) Dummy=1 if the firm invested in R&D in the last three years; 0 otherwise. BEEPS V
At least 2 (3) innovation types (0/1) Dummy=1 if the firm introduced two (three) or more of the following innovation 
types: product, process, organization or marketing innovation; 0 otherwise.
BEEPS V
Technological innovation Sum of the Product innovation and Process innovation dummy variables. BEEPS V
Aggregate innovation Sum of the dummy variables Product innovation , Process innovation , Organization 
innovation and Marketing innovation .
BEEPS V
Soft innovation Sum of the dummy variables Organization innovation  and Marketing innovation . BEEPS V
New to local market (0/1) Dummy=1 if the firm introduced a product (process) innovation that is both new to 
the firm and its local market in the last 3 years; 0 otherwise.
BEEPS V
New to national market (0/1) Dummy=1 if firm introduced a product (process) innovation that is both new to the 
firm and the national (Russian) market in the last 3 years; 0 otherwise.
BEEPS V
Number of products introduced Number of new or significantly improved products introduced in the last three years. BEEPS V
Number of processes introduced Number of new or significantly improved processes introduced in the last three years 
out of the following categories: production methods, logistics, ancillary support 
services. This variable thus ranges between 0 and 3.
BEEPS V
Developed with firm's own ideas (0/1) Dummy=1 if firm introduced a product (process) innovation that it developed or 
adapted using its own ideas in the last 3 years; 0 otherwise.
BEEPS V
Developed with others (0/1) Dummy=1 if firm introduced a product (process) innovation that it developed in 
cooperation with suppliers, clients or external academic or research institutions in the 
last 3 years; 0 otherwise.
BEEPS V
Developed with suppliers (0/1) Dummy=1 if firm introduced a product (process) innovation that it developed in 
cooperation with suppliers in the last three years; 0 otherwise; 0 otherwise.
BEEPS V
Production methods (0/1) Dummy=1 if the firm over the last three years introduced or significantly improved 
production methods; 0 otherwise.
BEEPS V
Logistics and delivery (0/1) Dummy=1 if the firm over the last three years introduced or significantly improved 
logistics, delivery or distribution methods for it's inputs and products; 0 otherwise.
BEEPS V
Support services (0/1) Dummy=1 if the firm over the last three years introduced or significantly improved 
ancillary support services, such as purchasing, accounting, computing and 
maintenance; 0 otherwise.
BEEPS V
Spent on external knowledge (0/1) Dummy=1 if firm spent on the acquisition of external knowledge in the last 3 years by 
purchasing or licensing an invention, patent or know-how in order to start producing a 
new product (apply a new production method); 0 otherwise
BEEPS V
Applied for a patent or trademark (0/1) Dummy=1 if firm applied for a patent or trademark in the last three years; 0 
otherwise.
BEEPS V
No production target (0/1) Dummy=1 if firm does not use explicit production targets; 0 otherwise. BEEPS V
Short-term targets only (0/1) Dummy=1 if firm only uses short-term production targets (< 1year); 0 otherwise. BEEPS V
High effort needed (0/1) Dummy=1 if firm was only able to achieve production targets with more than normal 
or extraordinary effort; 0 otherwise.
BEEPS V
Hired local consultant (0/1) Dummy=1 if over the last three years the firm hired at least once a local consultant 
(such as a management consultant, engineer, architect, accountant); 0 otherwise.
BEEPS V
Consulting: business skills improvements (0/1) Dummy=1 if over the last three years the firm hired at least once a local consultant to 
improve business skills (finance, marketing, communication, basic HR, business 
plans); 0 otherwise.
BEEPS V
Loan demand (0/1) Dummy=1 if the firm either applied for a loan or did not apply for a loan for reasons 
other than it did not need one; 0 otherwise.
BEEPS V
Credit constrained (broad) (0/1) Dummy=1 if the firm either got a loan application rejected or was discouraged from 
applying; 0 otherwise. Discouragement reasons: complex application procedures, 
unfavourable interest rates, too high collateral requirements, insufficient size of loan 
or maturity, informal payments necessary, belief that application would be rejected.
BEEPS V
Credit constrained (narrow) (0/1) Dummy=1 if the firm either got a loan application rejected or was discouraged from 
applying due to the abovementioned reasons except for complex application 
procedures and informal payments necessary; 0 otherwise.
BEEPS V
Firm has a loan (0/1) Dummy=1 if the firm has a line of credit or loan from a financial institution at the 
time of the survey; 0 otherwise.
BEEPS V
Loan from a state bank (0/1) Dummy=1 if the firm has a loan from a state bank; 0 otherwise. BEEPS V; BEPS II
Loan from a private domestic bank (0/1) Dummy=1 if the firm has a loan from a private domestic bank; 0 otherwise. BEEPS V; BEPS II
Loan from a foreign bank (0/1) Dummy=1 if the firm has a loan from a foreign bank; 0 otherwise. BEEPS V; BEPS II
Credit access and loan characteristics
Bank concentration Locality-level Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index. Market shares measured by branches. BEPS II
Bank concentration (asset weighted) Locality-level Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index. Market shares measured by branches 
and weighted by total assets of each bank.
BEPS II; Bankscope
Share foreign banks Ratio of foreign-bank branches to the total number of branches in a locality. BEPS II
Share of top 3 banks Ratio of branches owned by the largest three banks in the locality (measured by 
number of branches) to the total number of branches in the locality.
BEPS II
Bank branch density Number of bank branches per 1,000 inhabitants in the locality. BEPS II; Rosstat
Spetsbanks Number of Spetsbanks per million inhabitants in the locality. Schoors et al. (2014)
Profits/operating revenue (branch weighted) Branch-weighted profit-to-operating revenue ratio of the banks in the locality. BEPS II; Bankscope
Lerner index (branch weighted) Locality-level Lerner index. Branch-weighted average of Lerner index as estimated 
for each bank at the country level.
BEPS II; Bankscope
Domestic intrabank distance Average distance of the branches in a locality to their national HQs. BEPS II
Bank solvency Average equity-to-assets ratio of banks in a locality (branch weighted). BEPS II
Closure of banks with regional HQs Net number of branches of banks headquartered in a region that were closed between 
January 2004 and January 2006, per million population. 
Russian central bank
Security Average rating by firms in the locality (on a 5-point scale) of the extent to which 
crime, theft, and disorder are an obstacle to the current operations of the firm.
BEEPS V
Business licensing Average rating by firms in the locality (on a 5-point scale) of the extent to which 
acquiring business licensing and permits are an obstacle to the current operations of 
the firm.
BEEPS V
Political instability Average rating by firms in the locality (on a 5-point scale) of the extent to which 
political instability is an obstacle to the current operations of the firm.
BEEPS V
Courts Average rating by firms in the locality (on a 5-point scale) of the extent to which 
courts are an obstacle to the current operations of the firm.
BEEPS V
Education Average rating by firms in the locality (on a 5-point scale) of the extent to which an 
inadequately educated workforce is an obstacle to the current operations of the firm.
BEEPS V
Power cuts Share of firms in a locality that experienced a power cut in the past year. BEEPS V
High-speed internet Share of firms with a high-speed internet connection on its premises. BEEPS V
Firm characteristics
Firm size Log of number of permanent, full-time workers. BEEPS V
Firm age Log of number of years since the firm started operations. BEEPS V
Leasing fixed assets (0/1) Dummy=1 if the firm leased any fixed assets, such as machinery, vehicles, equipment, 
land or buildings in the past fiscal year; 0 otherwise.
BEEPS V
Received subsidies (0/1) Dummy= 1 if the firm received any subsidies from the national, regional or local 
governments or European Union sources over the past three years; 0 otherwise.
BEEPS V
External audit (0/1) Dummy=1 if the firm had its annual financial statements checked and certified by an 
external auditor in the past fiscal year; 0 otherwise.
BEEPS V
Training (0/1) Dummy=1 if the firm provided formal training programmes to its permanent, full-time 
employees in the past fiscal year; 0 otherwise.
BEEPS V
Technology license (0/1) Dummy=1 if the firm uses at present technology licensed from a foreign-owned 
company, excluding software; 0 otherwise.
BEEPS V
Quality certification (0/1) Dummy=1 if the firm has an internationally recognised quality certification (e.g. ISO 
9000 or HACP); 0 otherwise.
BEEPS V
National sales (0/1) Dummy=1 if the firm's main product or service is sold mostly across Russia as 
opposed to locally or internationally; 0 otherwise.
BEEPS V
Expect higher sales (0/1) Dummy=1 if the firm expected its annual sales to increase in the next fiscal year; 0 
otherwise.
BEEPS V
Purchasing fixed assets (0/1) Dummy=1 if the firm purchased any fixed assets - such as machinery, vehicles, 
equipment, land or buildings - in the past fiscal year; 0 otherwise.
BEEPS V
Manager's experience Log of number of years that the top manager has spent in the industry. BEEPS V
State connection (0/1) Dummy=1 if the firm was previously state owned, is currently partly state-owned or a 
subsidiary of a previously state-owned enterprise.
BEEPS V
Part of large firm (0/1) Dummy=1 if the firm is owned by a larger enterprise; 0 otherwise. BEEPS V
Foreign-owned firm (0/1) Dummy=1 if the firm's equity is partially or fully foreign owned; 0 otherwise. BEEPS V
Exporter (0/1) Dummy is1 if the firm exports at least part of its production; 0 otherwise.
Share of temporary workers Share of temporary workers in total firm employment in the past fiscal year BEEPS V
High-tech industry (0/1) Dummy=1 if the firm belongs to any of the following industries (classification 
follows ISIC Rev 3.1): 24-chemicals; 29-non-electric machinery; 30-office equipment 
and computers; 31-electric machinery; 32-electronic material; measuring and 
communication tools, TV and radio; 33-medical apparels and instruments; 34-
vehicles; 35-other transportation; 50-services of motor vehicles; 64-post and 
telecommunication; and 72-IT; 0 otherwise.
Low-tech industry (0/1) Dummy=1 if the firm belongs to an industry not classified as high-tech; 0 otherwise.
High (low) external-finance dependence (0/1) Dummy=1 if the firm belongs to an industry with an above (below) median value for 
external-finance dependence; 0 otherwise. We define external-finance dependence at 
the 2-digit ISIC Rev 3.1 level by averaging firms' reported proportion of working 
capital that was financed by sources other than internal funds or retained earnings; 0 
otherwise.
BEEPS V
High (low) tangibility industry (0/1) Dummy= 1 if the firm is in an industry with an above (below) median fraction of 
assets represented by net property, plant and equipment for US firms in the same 
industry during 1980–89; 0 otherwise.
Aghion and Kharrubi 
(2013)
Locality characteristics




Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Panel A: Innovation activity
Product innovation (0/1) 3,887 0.13 0.33 0 1
Process innovation  (0/1) 3,887 0.14 0.34 0 1
R&D (0/1) 3,887 0.11 0.31 0 1
Any innovation (0/1) 3,887 0.42 0.49 0 1
At least 2 innovation types (0/1) 3,887 0.27 0.44 0 1
At least 3 innovation types (0/1) 3,887 0.14 0.35 0 1
Technological innovation 3,887 0.27 0.55 0 2
Soft innovation 3,850 0.51 0.77 0 2
Aggregate innovation 3,850 0.77 1.10 0 4
Panel B: Product innovation
New to local market (0/1) 3,887 0.08 0.28 0 1
New to national market (0/1) 3,887 0.04 0.21 0 1
Number of products introduced 3,887 0.79 5.74 0 10
Developed with firm's own ideas (0/1) 3,887 0.07 0.26 0 1
Developed with others (0/1) 3,887 0.06 0.23 0 1
Developed with suppliers (0/1) 3,887 0.01 0.12 0 1
Panel C: Process innovation
New to local market (0/1) 3,887 0.08 0.26 0 1
New to national market (0/1) 3,887 0.03 0.17 0 1
Number of processes introduced 3,887 0.37 0.81 0 3
Developed with firm's own ideas (0/1) 3,887 0.06 0.25 0 1
Developed with others (0/1) 3,887 0.07 0.26 0 1
Developed with suppliers (0/1) 3,887 0.02 0.15 0 1
Production methods (0/1) 3,887 0.10 0.30 0 1
Logistics and delivery (0/1) 3,887 0.05 0.23 0 1
Support services (0/1) 3,887 0.07 0.26 0 1
Panel D: Acquiring external knowledge
Spent on external knowledge (0/1) 3,887 0.06 0.24 0 1
Applied for a patent or trademark (0/1) 3,887 0.06 0.24 0 1
Hired local consultant (0/1) 3,871 0.13 0.34 0 1
Consulting: business skills improvements (0/1) 3,887 0.11 0.31 0 1
Panel E: Access to credit
Loan demand (0/1) 3,887 0.55 0.50 0 1
Credit constrained (broad) (0/1) 2,138 0.68 0.47 0 1
Credit constrained (narrow) (0/1) 2,138 0.52 0.50 0 1
Firm has a loan (0/1) 3,849 0.26 0.44 0 1
from a state bank 1,010 0.46 0.50 0 1
from a private domestic bank 1,010 0.42 0.49 0 1
from a foreign bank 1,010 0.12 0.32 0 1
from a relationship bank 758 0.16 0.37 0 1
from a transaction bank 758 0.23 0.32 0 1
This table presents summary statistics for all variables used in the empirical analysis. Table A1 in
the Appendix provides variable definitions and data sources.
Bank concentration 3,887 0.29 0.29 0.04 1
Bank concentration (asset weighted) 3,887 0.19 0.32 0.00 1
Share foreign banks 3,887 0.10 0.07 0.00 0.26
Bank branch density 3,887 0.32 0.14 0.00 1.11
Share of top 3 banks 3,887 0.61 0.24 0.23 1
Spetsbanks 3,887 1.89 1.34 0.16 7.45
Closures of banks with regional HQs 3,887 0.64 1.92 -1.17 10.43
Profits/Operating revenue (branch weighted) 3,887 0.32 0.14 0.00 1.11
Lerner index (branch weighted) 3,887 0.61 0.24 0.23 1.00
Panel G: Firm characteristics
(log) Firm size 3,881 3.05 1.22 1.39 9.31
(log) Firm age 3,856 2.21 0.69 0 5.16
Leasing fixed assets (0/1) 3,887 0.17 0.38 0 1
Received subsidies (0/1) 3,887 0.04 0.20 0 1
External audit (0/1) 3,887 0.21 0.40 0 1
Training (0/1) 3,887 0.43 0.49 0 1
Technology license (0/1) 3,887 0.07 0.26 0 1
Quality certification (0/1) 3,887 0.11 0.32 0 1
National sales (0/1) 3,887 0.29 0.45 0 1
Expect higher sales (0/1) 3,887 0.50 0.50 0 1
Purchasing fixed assets (0/1) 3,887 0.36 0.48 0 1
(log) Manager's experience 3,777 2.43 0.72 0 4.09
State connection (0/1) 3,887 0.09 0.28 0 1
Part of large firm (0/1) 3,887 0.07 0.26 0 1
Foreign-owned firm (0/1) 3,887 0.03 0.17 0 1
Exporter (0/1) 3,887 0.09 0.29 0 1
Share of temporary workers 3,811 0.14 0.57 0 11.67
High-tech industry (0/1) 3,887 0.19 0.40 0 1
High external finance dependence (0/1) 3,887 0.48 0.50 0 1
High-tangibiliy industry (0/1) 1,265 0.34 0.47 0 1
Panel F: Local banking market characteristics
Table A3
Credit constraints, types of process innovation, and production targets












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Credit constrained (0/1) -0.3368** -0.2751*** -0.1147 0.4554*** 0.3435 -0.5830***
(0.1535) (0.0890) (0.1095) (0.1196) (0.2981) (0.2145)
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,089 2,089 2,089 260 260 260
This table shows regressions to estimate the impact of credit constraints on various types of process innovation and production targets.
This is the second stage of our IV estimation where Credit constrained (0/1) is instrumented as in column 1 of Table 3. Production 
methods is an indicator variable for firms that introduced new or significantly improved production methods. Support services is an
indicator variable for firms that introduced new or significantly improved ancillary support services, such as purchasing, accounting,
computing and maintenance. Logistics and delivery is an indicator variable for firms that introduced new or significantly improved
logistics, delivery or distribution methods for the firm's inputs or products. No production target is a dummy variable that is "1" if the
firm does not use explicit production targets. Short-term targets only is a dummy variable that is "1" if the firm only uses short-term
production targets (<1 year). High effort needed is a dummy variable that is "1" if the firm was only able to achieve its production
targets with more than normal or extraordinary effort. An inverse Mills' ratio, derived from the probit model in Table 2, is included. All
regressions also include industry and district fixed effects, firm covariates, and a constant. Robust standard errors are clustered at the
industry level are shown in parentheses; *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Table A1 contains all
variable definitions.
Table A4
Locality characteristics and bank presence
Dependent variable: Bank concentration Share foreign banks Spetsbanks
(1) (2) (3)
Large firms -0.0900 -0.0223 -0.0738
(0.0963) (0.0224) (0.2921)
Audited firms 0.0909 -0.0156 0.0647
(0.1050) (0.0223) (0.4573)
Average firm age -0.0023 0.0011** -0.0003
(0.0015) (0.0005) (0.0049)
Exporting firms 0.1316 0.0112 -0.1478
(0.1719) (0.0304) (0.4213)
Share firms with high-speed internet -0.0212 0.0355 -0.0124
(0.1105) (0.0282) (0.2282)
Share firms with power outages -0.0543 0.0206 0.3602
(0.0922) (0.0200) (0.2503)
Perceived security -0.0841 0.0023 0.1427
(0.0978) (0.0207) (0.3901)
Perceived political instability -0.0400 0.0068 0.1052
(0.0448) (0.0085) (0.1361)
Perceived education workforce -0.0480 0.0018 0.0005
(0.0417) (0.0085) (0.1098)
Constant 0.6361*** 0.0027 1.0444
(0.2300) (0.0554) (0.7966)
F-test for joint significance (p-value) 0.2407 0.2156 0.9354
R-squared 0.0710 0.0790 0.0176
Observations 158 158 158
This table shows regressions to estimate the correlation between locality-level characteristics and
local banking presence. Locality characteristics: share of large (100+ employees) firms; share of firms
that are externally audited; average firm age; share of exporting firms; share of firms with a high-speed
internet connection; share of firms that experienced a power cut in the past year; and three variables that
measure the locality-level average of firms' perceptions of the following business constraints: security,
political instability and education. All regressions include a constant. Robust standard errors are shown
in parentheses; *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Table A1
contains all variable definitions.
Table A5
Regional institutional characteristics and spetsbank presence
Dependent variable:
Time frame for independent variables: 1996-2000 2001-2004 2005-2008
(1) (2) (3)
Political openness -0.6497 0.2657 0.7085
(0.5088) (0.5345) (0.4792)
Elections 0.3778 0.0938 -0.3001
(0.4354) (0.3705) (0.3101)
Pluralism -0.4966 -0.1089 0.5165
(0.4727) (0.4132) (0.4432)
Media 0.1061 0.3852 -0.5845
(0.3897) (0.4456) (0.5007)
Economic liberalization 0.8572* 0.1660 -0.0844
(0.4675) (0.3609) (0.3602)
Civil society 0.0862 -0.3312 0.4561
(0.4262) (0.4511) (0.3313)
Political structure 0.1547 0.2135 0.0032
(0.3975) (0.4934) (0.4157)
Elites 0.0622 0.3180 -0.2972
(0.3450) (0.3470) (0.3791)
Corruption -0.6461* -0.6675* -0.0293
(0.3612) (0.3636) (0.3165)
Local self-government -0.0692 -0.5729 -0.1465
(0.3263) (0.3979) (0.3514)
Constant 2.4693** 2.4875** 0.6345
(1.1020) (1.0274) (0.8160)
F-test for joint significance (p-value) 0.3740 0.4993 0.4836
R-squared 0.1438 0.1342 0.1459
Observations 78 78 78
This table shows regressions to estimate the correlation between regional-level institutional
characteristics and the presence of spetsbanks. Each column regresses the number of Spetsbanks per
million population in a region on a set of political and economic indicators in that region, measured for
three different time periods. Regional political and economic characteristics are taken from Bruno et al.
(2013) who source them from Nikolay Petrov and Aleksei Titkov at the Carnegie Moscow Center
(http://atlas.socpol.ru/indexes/index_democr.shtml). See Bruno et al. (2013) for a detailed description.
All regressions include a constant. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses; *, **, *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Spetsbanks per region
Table A6
Quantifying omitted variables bias: Altonji ratios
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Credit constrained (0/1) -0.5522*** -0.4828*** -0.2199* -0.2259** -0.3323** -0.2569**
(0.1771) (0.1400) (0.1179) (0.1114) (0.1450) (0.1219)
Altonji ratio: 15.21 -14.59 3.02 2.87 -9.12 -2.29
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Inverse Mills' ratio Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Locality-specific controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 2,084 2,084 2,084 2,084 2,084 2,084
First-stage statistics:
  F-statistic on IVs 10.71 11.87 10.71 11.87 10.71 11.87
  Hansen J-statistic (p-value) 0.58 0.34 0.22 0.58 0.01 0.04
Technological 
innovation
Product innovation Process innovation
The odd columns in this table replicate our baseline regressions (cf. Table 4) while the even columns also include the
following locality-level controls: average distance of bank branches to their national HQs; average equity-to-assets ratio
of banks (weighted by the number of branches of each bank); bank branch density; share of firms with a high-speed
internet connection; share of firms that experienced a power cut in the past year; and five variables that measure the
locality-level average of firms' perceptions of the following business constraints: security, business licensing, political
instability, courts and education. The Heckman selection equation and the first stage of the IV estimation are not
reported (first-stage statistics are presented in the last two rows). The dependent variable is Technological innovation 
in columns 1-2, Product innovation in columns 3-4, and Process innovation in columns 5-6. The Altonji ratios are
measured following Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005). The ratios in the odd columns are based on a comparison of our
baseline specification (shown in these columns) to an (unreported) specification without firm controls. The ratios in the
even columns are based on a comparison of a specification with firm and locality-level controls (shown in the even
columns) to an (unreported) specification without any such controls. The Altonji ratio equals the value of the coefficient
in the regression including the controls divided by the difference between this coefficient and the one derived from the
regression without the controls. All regressions include the inverse Mills' ratio, industry and district fixed effects, and a
constant. Robust standard errors are clustered at the industry level and shown in parentheses; *, **, *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The F-statistic on IVs is for the F-test that the instruments are
jointly insignificant, while the p-value of the Hansen J-statistic is for the overidentification test that the instruments are
valid. Table A1 contains all variable definitions.
Table A7
Lender type and firm innovation
Panel A: Borrowing from a foreign bank






Soft innovation Aggregate 
innovation
At least 2 
innovation 
types
At least 3 
innovation 
types
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Foreign bank (0/1) 0.0748 0.0256 0.0492 0.1605 0.2299* 0.0916* 0.0282
(0.0544) (0.0353) (0.0467) (0.0988) (0.1292) (0.0484) (0.0390)
State bank (0/1) -0.0054 0.0256 -0.0309 0.0434 0.0366 0.0129 0.0041
(0.0413) (0.0233) (0.0321) (0.0578) (0.0940) (0.0419) (0.0324)
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Locality fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,026 1,026 1,026 1,017 1,017 1,026 1,026
R-squared 0.3707 0.3560 0.2813 0.2780 0.3370 0.2934 0.2774
Panel B: Borrowing from a relationship bank






Soft innovation Aggregate 
innovation
At least 2 
innovation 
types
At least 3 
innovation 
types
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Relationship bank (0/1) 0.0026 -0.0234 0.0260 0.0333 0.0493 -0.0052 0.0103
(0.0745) (0.0465) (0.0495) (0.1220) (0.1479) (0.0578) (0.0401)
State bank (0/1) -0.0525 -0.0104 -0.0421 -0.0497 -0.0916 -0.0658* 0.0039
(0.0464) (0.0341) (0.0276) (0.0824) (0.0997) (0.0378) (0.0208)
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Locality fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 746 746 746 739 739 746 746
R-squared 0.3956 0.3995 0.3118 0.3437 0.3756 0.3397 0.3134
This table reports OLS regression results on the relationship between the type of lender and firm innovation. All regressions include industry
and locality fixed effects, firm controls and a constant. Robust standard errors are clustered at the industry level and shown in parentheses. *,
**, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Table A1 in the Appendix contains all variable definitions.
(a) Economic activity across localities
(b) Bank branches across localities
Fig. A1. These maps show the distribution of economic activity (a) and bank branches (b) across Russia. Economic activity is the (log) gross cell product (GCP) in 2005, measured in
2005 USD at PPP exchange rates. The size of each circle captures the amount of (log) GCP in the corresponding geographical cell. Data source: G-Econ project (Yale University).
Bank branch data are taken from the EBRDs BEPS II survey and refer to the year 2011. Each dot indicates a bank branch.The separate western enclave is the Kaliningrad oblast.
(a) Bank concentration by locality across Russia
(b) Foreign bank presence by locality across Russia
Fig. A2. This map shows the variation in (a) banking concentration (measured by HHI), (b) share of foreign bank branches, and (c) spetsbank presence (number of spetsbanks per 
million population) across localities covered by the BEEPS survey in Russia. Larger circles indicate higher values for the corresponding variable. The separate western enclave is the 
Kaliningrad oblast.
(c) Spetsbank presence in 1995 by locality across Russia
Fig. A3. This figure shows scatter plots of the number of spetsbanks per million population versus various regional firm characteristics. Regional 
firm characteristics are: the share of large (100+ employees) firms; share of firms that are externally audited; average firm age; share of exporter 
firms; share of firms with a high-speed internet connection; share of firms that experienced a power cut in the past year; and three variables that 
measure the regional average of firms' perceptions of the following business constraints: security, political instability, and education/skills. Source 
firm characteristics: EBRD-World Bank BEEPS survey.
Fig. A4. This figure shows the correlations between the number of spetsbanks per million population versus various regional political and economic 
sub-indicators as taken from Bruno et al. (2013) who source them from Nikolay Petrov and Aleksei Titkov at the Carnegie Moscow Center 
(http://atlas.socpol.ru/indexes/index_democr.shtml). See Bruno et al (2013) for a detailed description of these indicators.
Fig. A5. This figure shows scatter plots of the correlation between the number of spetsbanks per million population and 
the average of regional political and economic sub-indicators from Bruno et al. (2013) for the three time windows for 
which these indicators were collected.
Fig. A6. This figure shows the correlations between the number of spetsbanks per million population versus the regional 
governor change and political fluidity variables from Bruno et al. (2013). See Bruno et al. (2013) for a detailed description 






Fig. A7. This figure shows the point estimate and 90% confidence interval for the impact of credit constraints
on technological innovation (α 1 in Equation 1) when the IV exclusion restriction is gradually relaxed. We
follow the local-to-zero approach of Conley, Hansen and Rossi (2012) using the prior that the direct effect of
local bank concentration and foreign-bank ownership on innovation is weakly positive. δ is zero corresponds to
the strict exogeneity case while higher values of δ  indicate a gradual weakening of the exogeneity assumption.
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